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FOREWORD
THE SNOWDEN EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF SPILLING
NATIONAL SECRETS
A SYMPOSIUM SNAPSHOT

Lauren A. Mullins*
On Friday, January 30, 2015, the Lincoln Memorial
University Duncan School of Law hosted the biennial Law
Review Symposium in honor of Professor Sandra C. Ruffin.1
Members of the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review,
faculty, staff, speakers, and members of the legal community
gathered in the Duncan School of Law Courtroom to discuss
the implications of the national security disclosures by former
government contractor Edward Snowden.

*

Lauren A. Mullins, B.S., Business Administration (University of
Virginia’s College at Wise); M.B.A. (East Tennessee State University);
Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2016 (Lincoln Memorial University
Duncan School of Law); Editor-in-Chief, LMU Law Review (20152016).
1 See LMU Law Review to Present Symposium on National Security and
Digital Surveillance, DSOL NEWS/EVENTS (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://law.lmunet.edu/2014/12/31/lmu-law-review-to-presentsymposium-on-national-security-and-digital-surveillance-in-the-us/.
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The Symposium speakers, who traveled to Knoxville
from all over the United States, are a fascinating group of
experts that offered a wide range of valuable perspectives:
Mr. James Bamford is a leading National Security
Agency expert, journalist, and bestselling author of The Shadow
Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA From 9/11 to The Eavesdropping on
America. We were fortunate to have Mr. Bamford’s unique
viewpoint, as he shared some of his rare personal access to
Edward Snowden--three days in Moscow conducting an
interview for a Wired magazine cover story.2 Later in this
volume, we have provided an edited transcript of Mr.
Bamford’s presentation.
Mr. Brett Max Kaufman is a Teaching Fellow at New
York University School of Law. Formerly a national security
fellow with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Mr.
Kaufman brought a pro-privacy perspective with his lecture
regarding the governments “collect it all” philosophy
concerning intelligence information.
Professor J. Richard Broughton is an Associate
Professor of Law at University of Detroit Mercy School of
Law. Professor Broughton’s lecture focused on the Treason
Clause of the Constitution and the required mental state for its
application. He argued that electronic communications that
reach the enemy do not constitute treason in the absence of a
specific intent to betray America.
Professor Broughton
graciously followed up his presentation with an article written
for this volume dedicated to the Symposium.
Professor Melanie Reid is an Associate Professor of
Law at LMU Duncan School of Law and former Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the Southern District of Florida. Professor Reid
has conducted extensive research into the constitutionality of
the use of intelligence information in criminal investigations,
called “parallel construction.” Professor Reid deserves special
recognition for her integral role in this Symposium. She
developed the Symposium theme, assisted in planning for and
securing a well-rounded selection of speakers, provided a
presentation to accompany her recently published article NSA
and DEA Intelligence Sharing: Why It Is Legal and Why Reuters

See James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug.
13, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/.
2
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and the Good Wife Got It Wrong,3 and submitted additional
work tailored to this publication. Thank you, Professor Reid,
for your hard work and dedication.
Mr. Chris Inglis is a former Deputy Director and 28year veteran of the NSA holding a number of senior
leadership positions in the organization.
Mr. Inglis’
presentation, “National Security in the Age of Cyberspace Can Convergence, Security, Privacy, and Transparency Coexist?” offered valuable insight from inside the government
agency. His lecture covered the framework and provided realworld examples of U.S. efforts to achieve the reconciliation of
the various aims embodied in the Constitution and principles
that both establish and constrain the work of the federal
government. An edited transcript of this presentation is
published in this volume.
Ms. Elisabeth Cook is a member of the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent,
bipartisan agency within the executive branch. Ms. Cook is a
practicing attorney, formerly with the U.S. Department of
Justice, and brought a wealth of knowledge on a wide range of
issues involving the balancing of government transparency
and the interests of national security. Her presentation
focused on the legal and policy-oriented history that informs
the current debate surrounding the government’s need to
protect classified information. Again, an edited transcript of
Ms. Cook’s presentation is published in this volume.
Special Agent Beth O’Brien is with the FBI and
Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership.
Special Agent
O’Brien’s presentation focused on the definition of an “insider
threat” and the FBI’s development of indicators and profiles of
potential insider threats.
Finally, Mr. Mark Jaycox is a Legislative Analyst for
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).
His focused
research includes issues with consumer privacy, civil liberties,
surveillance law, and cybersecurity and he has completed
extensive work on legislative efforts to reform the National
Security Agency and update surveillance law. Mr. Jaycox

See Melanie Reid, NSA and DEA Intelligence Sharing: Why It Is Legal
and Why Reuters and the Good Wife Got It Wrong, 68 SMU L. REV. 427,
468 (2015).
3
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presented the key items needed for reform, current proposals
in Congress, and the potential outcomes.
In addition to the work and transcripts published by
the Symposium participants in this volume, the following
articles are included:
Professor Jason Zenor’s article examines the existing
legal framework and modern competing needs of national
security, the defense industry, and the public interest. In
examining legal protections for sources of “leaked”
information, including historical examples, he suggests a new
policy which favors the free flow of information and promotes
whistleblowing and government transparency.
Dr. Daniel Alati’s article examines the effect that
Edward Snowden’s national security disclosures have had
thus far on the security establishments in Canada and the
U.K., noting a lack of intelligence activities oversight in both
countries. The article provides insight to the dearth of
legislative outcomes that have occurred as a result of the U.S.
leaks and suggests recommendations to prevent reoccurrence
of the situation.
Many people graciously contributed to the success of
this Symposium. We would like to give special thanks to:
Kathy Baughman, Kate Reagan, Andrew McCree, Laura Hash,
Keri Stophel, David Harmon, Robert Smith-Yanez, Union
Avenue Books, Miller & Miller Court Reporters, and Dead
End BBQ for their invaluable assistance and participation.
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THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN TREASON
J. Richard Broughton*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Treason” is a damning charge. Rhetorically, and
legally. It was long considered the most serious of offenses,
even more serious than murder. Consider, for example, that
in the Inferno, Dante places the murderers in the Seventh Circle
of Hell.1 But the traitors occupy the Ninth and lowest Circle.2

* Associate

Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy. I am
grateful to Nadine Hammoud, Zeina Rammal, Samia Abbas, and
Patrina Bergamo for their research and editorial assistance, and to
the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this Symposium.
1 See DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 95-99 (Mark Musa, ed. & trans.,
Indiana Critical Ed. 1995) (1308).
2 Id. at 230-35. Here, in Canto XXXIII, Dante travels through
Antenora, where he encounters famous traitors. At one point, he
sees two heads frozen inside of a single hole, with the head on top
gnawing on the brain of the lower head. Id. at 233. See also Paul G.
Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social
Construction of Crime, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 808-13 (2001)
(discussing Dante’s treatment of political crimes of betrayal).
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Blackstone labeled treason the worst of offenses,3 and other
authorities have followed that notion.4 But “treason” is
precisely how many government officials and political leaders
described Edward Snowden’s disclosure of sensitive national
security information.5 Senator Dianne Feinstein, then-chair of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Snowden committed
“an act of treason.”6 House Intelligence Committee chair Mike
Rogers of Michigan had similar words: “That is what we call a
traitor in this country. He has traded something of value for
his own personal gain that jeopardizes the national security of
the United States. We call that treason.”7 Former House
Speaker Newt Gingrich said on NBC’s Meet the Press about
Snowden: “[t]his was treason.”8 And Richard Clarke, former
White House counter-terrorism advisor and appointed
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *75.
See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807) (opinion
of Marshall, C.J.) (remarking that “there is no crime which can more
excite and agitate the passions of men than treason”); Stephan v.
United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1943) (observing that
“[t]reason is the most serious offense that may be committed against
the United States”); Erin Creegan, National Security Crime, 3 HARV.
NAT’L. SEC. J. 373, 376 (2012) (calling treason “the most serious of all
offenses against the nation”).
5 The Snowden affair is, of course, the subject of this symposium and
the basic facts are likely well-known to most readers. For a good
description of the controversy, though, see Bryan Burrough, et al.,
The Snowden Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and Light, VANITY FAIR,
available at
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/05/edwardsnowden-politics-interview (May 2014). The Snowden affair was
also the subject of a recently released documentary. See CITIZENFOUR
(Praxis Films 2014).
6 See Jeremy Herb & Justin Sink, Sen. Feinstein calls Snowden’s NSA
leaks an ‘act of treason,’ THE HILL (June 10, 2013, 10:19 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/304573-sen-feinstein-snowdensleaks-are-treason.
7 See Laura Barron-Lopez, Rogers says Snowden committed treason, THE
HILL (Dec. 22, 2013, 11:15 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/193832-rep-rogers-sayssnowden-committed-treason.
8 See Transcript, Meet the Press, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2014), available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcriptjune-1-2014-n121571 (remarks of Newt Gingrich).
3
4
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member of President Barack Obama’s expert panel on the
National Security Agency, said, “What Mr. Snowden did is
treason, was high crimes.”9
The fervor to brand Edward Snowden a traitor and
convict him of treason is an understandable political response
to his conduct. Perhaps “treason” is simply convenient
shorthand for describing serious criminal conduct involving
an intentional breach of national security, not meant to
describe the actual legal status of the conduct. An epithet, but
not a serious legal claim.10 But even if understandable, it
nevertheless reflects potential shortcomings in the public
understanding – and apparently, the understanding of our
political leaders, in particular – about the law of American
treason.
This, too, is understandable. Treason has been called
one of the great forgotten clauses of the Constitution.11
Despite its pedigree in our law, treason has received relatively
little academic attention. J. Willard Hurst’s collection of essays
on treason remains the leading academic treatment of the
subject,12 but only recently – over the past decade since the

Brian Ross & Lee Ferran, White House NSA Panel Member: Edward
Snowden’s Leaks Still ‘Treasonous,’ ABCNEWS (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/white-house-nsa-panel-membersnowdens-leaks-treasonous/story?id=21277856.
10 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An
Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNT’L L. 1443 (2009) (“Treason is both an ancient crime
and a popular epithet”).
Or, perhaps, the rhetoric of treason can even fall into the
category of joke-making. During the 2015 Academy Awards
broadcast, host Neil Patrick Harris joked, after Citizenfour had
received the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, that
Snowden “could not be here tonight for some treason.” See THR
Staff, Edward Snowden: I Laughed at Neil Patrick Harris’ Treason Joke,
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 23, 2015, 12:44 PM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/edward-snowden-ilaughed-at-777125.
11 See Carlton F.W. Lawson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of
Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 865
(2006).
12 See J. WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES:
COLLECTED ESSAYS (1971). See also Willard Hurst, Treason in the
9
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September 11 attacks – has the Treason Clause begun to
receive greater attention from contemporary scholars.13
Professor George Fletcher lamented many years ago that
treason is no longer part of a law school course on criminal
law.14
The law of American treason thus remains
underdeveloped, incomplete, and lousy with gaps. But that
might actually be a good thing. A more well-developed
treason law would likely require that treason be far more
common. Yet treason prosecutions have been sufficiently rare
in our history that relatively few opportunities have arisen for
courts and lawyers to adequately answer the many questions
that could arise from an accusation of, and prosecution for,
treason.
Treason was a subject of some interest in the early
years of the Republic – Benedict Arnold is perhaps our most
famous traitor, though his betrayal at West Point occurred
before the Constitution was drafted,15 and the treason trial of
Aaron Burr perhaps the most prominent one of its kind during
the era, produced some early Supreme Court precedent on the
meaning of American treason law.16 Quite naturally, treason

United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226 & 395 (1945) (explaining law of
treason in essays that would later form Hurst’s book on treason).
13 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 11; Eichensehr, supra note 10; Paul T.
Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v.
United States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 635 (2009);
Henry Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea to
Afghanistan, 29 S.U. L. REV. 181 (2002); Suzanne Kelly Babb, Fear and
Loathing in America: Application of Treason Law in Times of National
Crisis and the Case of John Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721 (2003);
George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611
(2004). For a collection of the scholarship that discusses treason
history, see Lawson, supra note 11, at 866 n.7.
14 See George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 194
(1982).
15 For an excellent account of General Washington’s response to the
Arnold affair, in a chapter appropriately entitled “Treason,” see
JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE MAN 14148 (1974).
16 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). For an excellent
account of the Burr trial, see R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL
OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CHARACTER WARS OF THE
NEW NATION (2012).

9
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was also a subject of debate during the Civil War period.17 But
it was not until World War II that treason prosecutions
became prominent again. The 1940s saw a substantial number
of treason prosecutions.18 Then there was the infamous
incident involving Jane Fonda’s embrace of the North
Vietnamese, which led to public branding of her as a traitor
and the unflattering nickname of “Hanoi Jane.”19 Finally, it
was in the post-September 11 world and the American effort
to grapple with the problem of its own citizens joining forces
with international terrorists that treason reemerged as a more
serious prosecutorial option for the federal government.
John Walker Lindh offers an example. Though he
traveled to the Middle East to study Arabic, Lindh later
trained with a terrorist group and crossed from Pakistan into
Afghanistan and joined a group of fighters that were funded
by Osama bin Laden.20 The group sent him to fight with the
Taliban against the Northern Alliance.21
He eventually
surrendered to the Northern Alliance, and was recaptured
after being temporarily freed during an armed attack by
Taliban detainees upon a CIA operative who had been
interviewing Lindh.22 Lindh was indicted and eventually
pleaded guilty to charges of providing services to the Taliban
and carrying an explosive device during commission of a
felony.23 He is serving a twenty-year sentence in federal
prison today. And Yasser Esam Hamdi, a native of Louisiana,
rather than being prosecuted in a civilian American court was
instead detained on a Naval brig and never charged by the

See JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND TREASON IN THE
CIVIL WAR (2011).
18 See Crane, supra note 13, at 638-39, 677-78.
19 See Holzer, supra note 13, at 210-13. Unlike Holzer, Fletcher does
not see Fonda’s conduct as treasonous. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at
200.
20 See Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37a (E.D. Va. Feb. 5,
2002).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. Some have argued that the Government should have charged
Lindh with treason. See, e.g., Holzer, supra note 13, at 220-21;
Douglas W. Kmiec, Try Lindh for Treason, It’s Not Too Late, National
Review Online, (posted Feb. 12, 2002).
17
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Department of Justice with a crime.24 His case eventually
went to the Supreme Court, which held that the President
enjoyed the power to detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant,
but that he was entitled to some process to challenge his
detention.25 But it was Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi that
invoked treason. Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, argued that
where an American citizen is captured fighting for the enemy,
the government has two options: suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, or try him for treason or some other crime.26 In
Hamdi’s case, the Government did neither.
Finally, in 2006, the Government obtained its first
treason indictment since World War II, when it charged Adam
Gadahn with treason after Gadahn appeared in al Qaeda
videos.27 In them, he appeared with bin Laden and Ayman alZawahiri, praised the September 11 attacks and encouraged al
Qaeda to use its capability to attack the United States again.28
Gadahn was never captured and tried; rather, he was killed in
January 2015 during a counterterrorism operation.29
Perhaps treason has fallen out of favor with federal
prosecutors because of the enhanced evidentiary requirements
that necessarily come with a treason prosecution. Perhaps it is
because other statutes exist that reach the same types of
conduct without the burdens that come with the definition of
treason – material support for terrorism, rebellion or
insurrection, seditious conspiracy, advocating overthrow of
the government, and recruiting others for service in armed
hostility against the United States all come to mind. Perhaps it
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Id. at 524, 533.
26 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27 See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gadahn, SA CR
05-254 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006).
28 Id.
29 See Greg Botelho & Ralph Ellis, Adam Gadahn, American mouthpiece
for al Qaeda, killed, CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/23/world/adam-gadahn-al-qaeda/
(posted Apr. 23, 2015). For a brief discussion of the Gadahn case, and
a suggestion that the Government used the wrong theory of treason
with respect to Gadahn’s conduct, see Kristen Eichensehr, Treason’s
Return, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 229 (2007). Crane’s article on
Cramer also discusses the Gadahn case. See Crane, supra note 13, at
636.
24
25
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is some combination of these.30 Perhaps, as George Fletcher
has argued, the decline of treason has less to do with proof of
the elements and more to do with changing attitudes toward
crime and criminal law.31 The feudal bases of treason are
simply inconsistent with the liberal version of the criminal law
that prevails today, a criminal law that prefers “systematic and
scientific control of violence” to the symbolism of ancient
treason law.32 But perhaps, in some cases at least, the trouble
is not with proving the traitor’s actions but, rather, his intent.
Intention, Hurst observed, is “at the heart” of treason.33 How
does American treason law apply to one who communicates
information that can be, and in fact is, both helpful and readily
available to the enemy, or commits an overt act that in fact
assists the enemy, but who does not simultaneously
specifically intend to betray the United States? American
criminal law has long valued the imposition of mens rea, both
as a check on the power of the state and as a method for
measuring culpability.34 And a charge as serious as treason
most surely requires proof of some heightened state of moral
culpability at the time of the alleged overt act.
The Snowden case therefore presents a distinctly
modern wrinkle in the application of treason law, one that is
implicated by the popular cry of “treason” against Snowden.
It raises the problem that one may aid and comfort the enemy
without actually intending to do so as a way of betraying
America. Can we (should we) still call that treason? That is
the specific problem I want to explore. To do that, I will
describe the American law of treason by giving special
attention to the provision for adhering to the enemy, giving
them aid and comfort (what I will call Adherence Treason, to
distinguish it from Levying War Treason) and the mental state
that American treason law requires for a conviction on this
ground. My project, then, is to explain why it is the mens rea
element of treason law that complicates that law’s application
to Snowden’s case, and indeed in any case in which an
See Crane, supra note 13, at 680-93.
See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1628.
32 Id.
33 HURST, supra note 12, at 15.
34 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01, at
117 (6th ed. 2012).
30
31
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American has aided the enemy through an electronic
communication.

II. AMERICAN TREASON LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF
TREASON MENS REA
Treason is the only crime that the federal Constitution
explicitly defines. “Treason against the United States,” the
text says,
shall consist only in levying war against them,
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of
treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court. The Congress shall
have the power to declare the punishment of
treason, but no attainder of treason shall work
corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during
the life of the person attained.35
Congress has also codified treason as a federal crime, at
section 2381 of Title 18. But because the crime of treason is
constitutionalized, Congress cannot alter or modify the
definition of treason by ordinary legislation. So Section 2381
provides that: “Whoever, owing allegiance to the United
States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort within the United States or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall
be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this
title not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding
any office under the United States.”36 As treason is punishable
by death, Congress has enacted a set of procedures for capital
treason prosecutions that is distinct from the procedures
employed in typical capital murder prosecutions at the federal
level.37
U.S. CONST. art. III, §3.
18 U.S.C. §2381 (2012).
37 In a capital treason prosecution, the list of statutory aggravating
factors is shorter than for capital homicide prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. §
3591(a) (2012), and the Government need not prove the specific
35
36
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Notice the word “only” in the constitutional text: there
are only two ways to commit treason – by levying war against
the United States, or by giving aid and comfort to the enemy
(which is how one adheres to the enemy). This is a product of
design. The Framers of the Constitution explicitly desired a
limited treason in America.38 The crime was meant to be
narrow, more narrow even, than its chief English antecedent.
The Statute of 25 Edward III, enacted in 1351, created seven
basic categories of treason for purposes of English law:
compassing or imagining the death of the king, or queen, or
their eldest son and heir; violating the wife of the king or the
wife of the king’s eldest son; levying war against the king in
his realm; adhering to the king’s enemies in his realm, giving
them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere;
counterfeiting; killing the chancellor, the treasurer, or the
king’s justices; murder of a master by a servant, a husband by
a wife, or a prelate by a cleric (this was called “petty treason”;
the other categories were “high treason”).39 This statute did
away with the common law of treason in England and was
greatly admired not only by English authorities,40 but also by
American colonists and the founders, who drew upon its
language in crafting colonial treason law and the
constitutional definition.41 With the development of treason
law in America in the aftermath of the Revolution, however, it
became clear that certain forms of English treason would not
apply here.42 Of course, many of the categories of English
treason were predicated upon acts taken against the
monarchy, and America would not be a monarchy.
Americans could have adopted some of these provisions and
statutory mental state factors related to death that are required in a
capital homicide prosecution. Compare 18 U.S.C. §3591(a)(1) with 18
U.S.C. §3591(a)(2)(A-D).
38 See HURST, supra note 12, at 130.
39 Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III, ch. 2 (1351).
40 See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 2 (London, 5th ed. 1671).
41 See HURST, supra note 12, at 130-40. Curiously, as Hurst explains,
the original draft of the Constitution did not contain a treason
provision. Id. at 129. The Committee of Detail created and inserted
the Treason Clause into the Constitution. Id. The Convention then
fully discussed the new language on August 20, 1787. Id. at 130.
42 Id. at 106, 126.

THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN TREASON

14

simply made them acts against elected political leaders, but
many of these notions were never considered.
Moreover, the leading founder on treason,
Pennsylvania’s James Wilson (who served on the Committee
of Detail that drafted the Treason Clause), argued that 25
Edward III was the chief basis for our treason law and that
American treason should be interpreted in light of that
statute.43 Other leading authorities agreed.44 Wilson remarked
that the charge of treason was a dangerous charge, so it was
important to limit the Government’s power to bring it, thus
further explaining the narrowness of American treason under
the Constitution.45 And Chief Justice Marshall, in narrowly
construing the text of the Treason Clause in Ex Parte Bollman,
said that “[a]s there is no crime which can more excite and
agitate the passions of men than treason, no charge demands
more from the tribunal before which it is made a deliberate
and temperate inquiry.”46 The Constitution offers a limited
notion of treason, Marshall wrote, “[t]o prevent the possibility
of those calamities which result from the extension of treason
to offenses of minor importance.”47 Constructive treasons, in
particular, were viewed by the founding generation as a threat
to political liberty, so the evolution of American treason law
was careful to avoid these dangers.48 Hamilton, in responding

See HURST, supra note 12, at 135.
Id. at 130-31.
45 JAMES WILSON, 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1149-50
(Mark David Hall & Kermit Hall, ed. 2007), available at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/wilson-collected-works-of-jameswilson-vol-2. Wilson says, referring to Montesquieu’s observations,
that treason “is indeterminate,” which “along is sufficient to make
any government degenerate into arbitrary power.” Id. at 1149. He
continues that in both monarchies and republics, treason law
“furnishes an opportunity to unprincipled courtiers, and to
demagogues equally unprincipled, to harass the independent citizen,
and the faithful subject, by treasons, and by prosecutions for
treasons, constructive, capricious, and oppressive.” Id.
46 Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807).
47 Id. at 125-26.
48 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (discussing the
negative view of constructive treasons among the founding
generation). See also Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir.
43
44
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to the complaint that the original Constitution contained no
bill of rights, even included the Treason Clause among those
constitutional provisions (beyond the structural ones) that
offered protections to the individual against government
action.49
So the first principle we can derive from the definition
of American treason – and one that would militate against a
treason charge for someone like Snowden – is that it is
deliberately narrow and does not embrace constructive or
questionable treasons.
The other thing worth noticing about the text’s
definition of the crime is that it does not include an explicit
mens rea term. Or does it? In some ways, this should be
unsurprising. The English Treasons Statute, 25 Edward III,
did not contain familiar common law mens rea terminology.
And still, by the time of the framing, mens rea was wellknown to the English courts, the English common law, and to
colonial criminal law.50 Blackstone highlighted the state of
mind that makes for treason noted in light of the English law,
stating that “a bare intent to commit treason is many times
actual treason: as imagining the death of the king, or
conspiring to take away his crown.”51 Early treason case law
referred to treasonous intention.52 And Justice Story spoke of
“intention” and “treasonable purpose” while adjudicating a
treason case in Rhode Island53 (though he offered his
statement of the law with respect to levying war, rather than
1943) (stating “[t]he Constitution has left no room for constructive
treason”).
49 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter, ed., 1961).
50 See Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal
Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815 (1980). See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW §5.1(a), at 253 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that since about
1600, common law judges defined crimes to contain some bad state
of mind, and setting forth conventional common law mens rea
terms).
51 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35.
52 See United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397, 399 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No
15,407); United States v. Pryor, 27 F. Cas. 628, 630 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814)
(No. 16,096).
53 See Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (C.C.
D. R.I. 1842) (No. 18.275).
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adhering to the enemy, and defined the treasonable purpose
broadly).54 But none of these early authorities meaningfully
explained the precise culpable mental state that the
government must prove to establish treason.
Despite the lack of clarity in the constitutional or
statutory text as to the precise mens rea required for treason, it
is generally agreed today that treason requires a specific intent
to betray the United States. Perhaps the most important
treason case of the modern Supreme Court is Cramer v. United
States,55 decided in 1945, and it is here where we first
encounter the modern Court’s discussion of treason mens rea.
In 1942, German submarines arrived at the coasts of
Long Island and Florida.56 Four men exited each sub and
buried their Nazi uniforms and then dressed as civilians.57
They had trained at a sabotage school in Germany and were
supposed to destroy American war infrastructure.58 Although
all of the men had lived in the United States, all but one were
German citizens. 59 They were eventually arrested and tried in
military tribunals, which the Supreme Court validated in Ex
parte Quirin.60 Cramer was born in Germany but was
naturalized in the United States in 1936.61 He befriended
Warner Thiel, who would become one of the aforementioned
See Lawson, supra note 11, at 911 (explaining Story’s view).
Lawson also helpfully notes that an early Nevada statute, defining
“levying war” treason for state law purposes, contained an explicit
mens rea element: “when persons arise in insurrection with the
intent to prevent, in general, by force and intimidation, the execution
of statute in this state, or to force its repeal.” Id. at 912 (citing NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §196.020 (LexisNexis 2011)). The statute includes,
but does not define, adhering to the enemies of Nevada, giving them
aid and comfort.
55 325 U.S. 1 (1945). Crane’s article offers a valuable history of the
case, as well as of the Justice’s decision-making. See generally Crane,
supra note 13.
56 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 48. The Court held that Herbert Hans Haupt, one of the
saboteurs, could be tried by military commission, rather than by
civilian court for treason, even though he may have been an
American citizen. Id. at 38.
61 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 3-4.
54
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Nazi saboteurs.62 They were roommates and even engaged in
a joint business venture.63 Responding to an anonymous note,
Cramer went to Grand Central Station and met Thiel for
drinks.64 They then met two more times and Thiel gave
Cramer a money belt with $3,600 in it.65 Cramer kept a
portion, set aside a portion in case Thiel needed it, and then
put the rest in a safe deposit box.66 The FBI observed two of
the meetings and arrested Cramer.67 Cramer was tried for
treason, but said he lacked any treasonous intent and that his
overt acts did not, on their face, manifest treason.68
The Supreme Court held for Cramer. In the course of
doing so, the Court held that Congress could criminalize
treasonous conduct under other statutory crimes without all of
the procedural safeguards and limitations that attend treason
itself.69 The Court also recognized that the overt act need not
manifest treasonous intent.70 However, the overt act must
actually give aid and comfort to the enemy.71 Cramer’s
meetings with Thiel did not satisfy this standard.72
With
respect to the mental element of the crime, the Court
grounded treason mens rea in the textual requirement of
“adherence” to the enemy. “A citizen may favor the enemy
and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this
country’s policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act
of aid or comfort to the enemy, there is no treason,” Justice
Jackson’s opinion declared.73

Id. at 4.
Id. at 3-4.
64 Id. at 5.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 31. See also Crane, supra note 13, at 642 (describing Cramer’s
claims before the Court). According to Crane, Cramer claimed he
did not possess treasonous intent because he was unaware of Thiel’s
sabotage plans and met with Thiel simply as a friend. Id.
69 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 39-40.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 29.
62
63
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On the other hand, a citizen may take actions,
which do aid and comfort the enemy – making
a speech critical of the government or opposing
its measures, profiteering, striking in defense
plants or essential work, and the hundred other
things which impair our cohesion and diminish
our strength – but if there is no adherence to the
enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray,
there is no treason.74
The opinion elaborated upon treason mens rea by stating that
“[q]uestions of intent in a treason case are even more
complicated than in most criminal cases because of the
peculiarity of the two different elements which together make
the offense.”75 Treasonous intent cannot be shown through
overt acts that are negligent or undesigned.76 Rather, “to make
treason the defendant must not only intend the act, but he
must intend to betray his country by means of the act.”77
Treasonous intent can be inferred from conduct (including the
relevant overt act itself), and one is deemed to intend the
natural consequences of his actions.78 Here, however, the
overt acts that the Government alleged were relatively trivial
and did not themselves demonstrate treasonous intent.79 The
Court also proved unwilling to find treason merely from an
alleged treasonous intent in meeting with Thiel and another
man named Edward Kerling (leader of the saboteurs),
concluding that those acts did not actually have the effect of
giving aid and comfort to the enemy.80 To conclude otherwise
would “carry us back to constructive treasons.”81
The first time that the Court ever affirmed a treason
conviction was in Haupt v. United States.82 There, a father of
one of the Nazi saboteurs and an American citizen – Hans
Id.
Id. at 31.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 31-32.
79 Id. at 39-40.
80 Id. at 40.
81 Id.
82 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
74
75
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Max Haupt – was convicted of treason after giving his son
(Herbert Hans Haupt) shelter, finding him a job, and giving
him a car, all while knowing that his son was on the sabotage
mission.83 Relying on the understanding of the overt act from
Cramer, the Court held that these acts by Haupt were sufficient
to actually give aid and comfort to the enemy.84 But the Court
was also satisfied that Haupt possessed the requisite
treasonous intent.85 Because Haupt knew of his son’s role, his
aid to his son was not mere fatherly care. It was done with the
purpose of assisting his son in executing the German sabotage
effort, not just of aiding his son as a son.86
Following the lessons of Haupt and Cramer in the world
of treason mens rea is Kawakita v. United States,87 another case
arising out of actions amid World War II. There, Tomoya
Kawakita was a dual Japanese-American citizen who traveled
to Japan to study at Meiji University.88 He renewed his
passport in 1941 and took the oath of allegiance to America.89
After school, and after registering with a family census
registry in Japan (the Koseki), he later accepted a job with
Oeyama Nickel Industry Company, that provided metals for
the Japanese war effort.90 That company also employed
American prisoners of war, and Kawakita was originally hired
as an interpreter for communications between the Japanese
and the American POWs.91 Kawakita’s treason charge was
based on several different alleged overt acts, all of which
involved severe maltreatment of the American POWs who
Id. at 632-33. The son Herbert, of course, was among those
convicted in Quirin.
84 Id. at 636.
85 Id. at 641-42.
86 Id.
87 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
88 Id. at 720. The threshold issue before the Supreme Court was
whether Kawakita had renounced his American citizenship, thus
exempting him from American treason law (because, if true, he
would no longer owe allegiance to the United States). Id. at 720-36.
The Court rejected his claim, finding that he retained his dual
citizenship. Id. at 736. This issue was the basis for Chief Justice
Vinson’s dissent. Id. at 745-46 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 720.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 720-21.
83
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worked at the company.92 He was tried for, and convicted of,
treason when, after returning to the United States in 1946, a
former American POW at the nickel company recognized
Kawakita.93
In affirming the conviction, Justice Douglas’s opinion
for the Court explained that treason requires both giving aid
and comfort to the enemy (the physical act required) and
treasonous intent (the mens rea). “One may think disloyal
thoughts and have his heart on the side of the enemy. Yet if he
commits no act giving aid and comfort to the enemy, he is not
guilty of treason,” Douglas wrote.94 “He may on the other
hand commit acts which do give aid and comfort to the enemy
and yet not be guilty of treason, as for example when he acts
impulsively with no intent to betray.”95 The Court then
explained that although the constitutional requirement of two
witnesses applies to the physical overt act, the requirement
does not extend to the mens rea.96 Rather, the Court said, the
treasonous intent is inferred from conduct, from the overt acts,
from the defendant’s statements about the war, and, as here,
from the defendant’s professions of loyalty to the enemy
nation.97
Against this judicial backdrop, one can see why a
treason prosecution against Edward Snowden would be a
daunting task. Snowden himself has publicly discussed the
controversy (in Moscow, he has apparently built his own
studio for conducting interviews).98 He has stated publicly
Id. at 737-39.
Id. at 722.
94 Id. at 736.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 742-43.
98 See Katrina vanden Heuvel & Stephen F. Cohen, Edward Snowden:
A ‘Nation’ Interview, THE NATION (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/186129/snowden-exileexclusive-interview#; James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the
World, WIRED, Aug. 13, 2014,
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/; Alan
Rusbridger & Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden interview – the edited
transcript, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edwardsnowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview-transcript; Burrough, et al.,
92
93
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that his desire – his intent, if you will – was to alert the public
to the scope of the American surveillance regime and to spur
changes that would mitigate the surveillance state and hold
public officials accountable.99 At no point does he state that it
was his intention to aid the enemy in a war against America or
to assist in planning an attack on the United States. Now, of
course, one might imagine that he would never publicly say
that, even if it were true. He is fully aware that he faces
criminal charges and his statements seem naturally selfserving. But the point is that in the absence of such a
confession, the prosecution would have to obtain other
objective evidence of a desire to do just that, to adhere to the
enemy by intending to betray the United States. At least on
the existing publicly-available evidence, that would be
difficult indeed. One need not agree with his actions in order
to concede that there is insufficient evidence of his adherence
to the enemy.
Now, this is not to say that such evidence is impossible
to discover. In Kawakita, for example, the defendant made
repeated statements about his desire to see America harmed.
The statements included “It looks like MacArthur took a runout powder on you boys;” “The Japanese were a little superior
to your American soldiers;” You Americans don’t have no
chance. We will win the war;” “Well, you guys needn’t be
interested in when the war will be over because you won’t go
back; you will stay here and work. I will go back to the States
because I am an American citizen;” “We will kill all you
prisoners right here anyway, whether you win the war or lose
it. You will never get back to the States;” “I will be glad when
all of the Americans is dead, and then I can go home and live
happy.”100 If the Government could find such statements from
Snowden – for example, that he hoped his disclosures would
assist the enemy in perpetrating an attack, or that an attack on
supra note 3. See also Inside the Mind of Edward Snowden: Interview
with Brian Williams, NBC NEWS, available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview
(aired May 29, 2014) (appearing on television for interview with
NBC anchor Brian Williams).
99 James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 13,
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/.
100 Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 743.
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American interests, citizens, or military capabilities would
teach us a valuable lesson about our national intelligence
policies – then the case for treason would be measurably
stronger. But if Snowden’s desire was merely to alert the
public to policies with which he disagreed, then, however
misguided his tactics, that state of mind is an unlikely
candidate for treasonous intent.101
The “intent” of treason, then, seems a lot like motive.
Indeed it is. One may object that intent and motive are not the
same. And they are not. But “intent,” as such, is a difficult
word to understand in isolation.
The criminal law,
particularly in the world of specific intent crimes, often makes
motive relevant to proof of the offense.102 For example, one of
the ways in which we distinguish a traditional specific-intent
crime is to say that it is one that requires some special
motivation for its commission (such as when we require “the
intent to steal” or the “intent to kill”).103 Moreover, other
crimes, such as hate crimes,104 are defined by the special
motive that attends their commission. Though the relevant act
(e.g., causing bodily harm) may be performed intentionally or
knowingly, it is a hate crime only when the act is performed
with a particular bias motivation (e.g., because of the victim’s
actual or perceived race or religion).105
Treason is
substantially similar. The Government must prove that the
underlying overt act of providing aid and comfort to the
enemy was done with a purpose to betray the United States
and that purpose will often merge with the particular motive
to see harm befall the country. Still, courts have been reluctant
to make too much of this overlap. In two of the World War II
treason prosecutions involving Americans who worked as
radio broadcasters for the Germans – Chandler v. United
States106 and Best v. United States107 – the defendants argued
This conclusion makes comments like those of Speaker Gingrich
on Meet the Press all the more perplexing. Gingrich said that
Snowden “may be a patriotic traitor. He may think, in his own
mind, he did the right thing. This was treason.” See Meet the Press
Transcript, supra note 8.
102 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, §10.04[A][2], at 123.
103 Id. at 138.
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012).
105 Id.
106 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948).
101
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that even though they intended to aid the German war effort
and to create disunity and harm to American morale during
the war, they had the special motive of rendering such aid
because, they argued, it would be better for Americans by
halting the pursuit of world domination by Jewish
Communism.108 In each case, the First Circuit rejected the
claim that this motive negated their intent to betray, because
each defendant had the purpose of aiding the enemy.109
Contrary to the First Circuit’s analysis,110 though, motive was
actually not irrelevant in these cases. The defendants had a
treasonous motive – in addition to their purpose to render aid
to Germany, they also were motivated directly by a desire to
see Germany prevail in the war (which would necessarily
mean an American defeat).111 It was simply mixed with yet
another, somewhat more attenuated, motive. In this sense, the
mixed motives appear similar to the mixed motives of Hans
Max Haupt.112 It is difficult to imagine a case in which the
actor has the purpose of aiding the enemy in harming or
defeating the United States, and yet he is acting solely with a
motive that does not involve such harm or defeat but rather

184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950).
See Chandler, 171 F.2d at 925. In each case, the defendant had
served as a broadcaster for a German radio station. See id. at 926;
Best, 184 F.2d at 134. The purpose of the broadcasts was to engage in
“psychological warfare” to support the German war effort. Chandler,
171 F.2d at 926. The radio broadcasts were directed by the German
Propaganda Ministry. Id. Broadcasting for the enemy was a popular
basis for a treason charge during this period. See also Gillars v.
United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (involving broadcasting
for the Germans); D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.
1951) (involving broadcasting for the Japanese).
109 Chandler, 171 F.2d at 942-45; Best, 184 F.2d at 137-38.
110 Chandler, 171 F.2d at 944 (holding that one who “trafficks with
enemy agents” and gives them aid and comfort “is guilty of treason,
whatever his motive.”).
111 Id. at 944.
112 See HURST, supra note 12, at 245 (arguing that Haupt holds that as
long as one of the mixed motives is to betray the United States, the
existence of a more pure motive is irrelevant). Hurst argues that
Chandler and Best are related, but distinct, on the question of motive.
Id. As indicated here, I find them more similar on this point than
does Hurst.
107
108
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would benefit America. The specific “intent” of treason, and
the bad motive that distinguishes it, simply converge.
One may argue (the Government certainly did in
Cramer)113 that the Court’s approach makes treason too
difficult to prove. Treason, one may contend, could be an
especially powerful prosecutorial tool in times of national
emergency or, as today, when grave dangers can be posed to
national security as a result of advances in technology that
make communicating with the enemy so easy. The Court’s
response to this, and one that arguably would fit the view of
the Constitution’s Framers, was simple: treason is supposed to
be hard to prove.114 Its difficulty helps to protect against
politically vindictive prosecutions or the punishment of those
who merely think disloyal thoughts. Yet, as Haupt and
Kawakita certainly show us, the task is not impossible. Specific
intent is not, and has never been, an insurmountable barrier to
conviction, even in treason law.115 And in light of the ways in
which electronic or digital communication can ease the
provision of aid and comfort to America’s enemies, Adherence
Treason could arguably form a larger share of federal
prosecutorial energy and resources in the coming years. After
all, as the many stories of Americans who have lately sought
to join forces with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
demonstrate, many of those who have joined the cause of
America’s enemies have not been shy about expressing their
adherence to those that would harm us.116
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
115 See Haupt, 330 U.S. at 641-42; Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 743.
116 See, e.g., Ed Payne, More Americans volunteering to help ISIS, CNN
(posted Mar. 5, 2015, 4:55 PM), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/05/us/isis-us-arrests/; see also
Gadahn Indictment, supra note 27.
Incidentally, whether ISIS (or, ISIL) currently constitutes an
“enemy” of the United States for purposes of treason law is perhaps
an open question, particularly in the absence of a specific
authorization for the use of force against that group. I leave that
question for another time, and assume for the purposes of this article
that ISIS could be an enemy for treason purposes (and I currently
believe that is the better understanding of the issue). Eichensehr
offers an excellent discussion of this issue in her piece, though ISIS
did not emerge until after her piece was published, and so her focus
113
114
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III. ADHERENCE TREASON AS A SPECIES OF COMPLICITY?
This “intent to betray” doctrine that I have discussed is
now well-established. It has been repeated in the Supreme
Court, repeated by other courts, and repeated in the literature
on treason. More than anything, as I have explained, that is
the principle that would foreclose treason liability for Edward
Snowden. And yet, established though it is, the derivation of
this notion remains unclear.
I asked earlier whether the text really does contain a
mens rea element. It does not, after all, do so in the
conventional way. There is no familiar, common law mens rea
term (no “intentionally,” or “willfully,” for example), and
especially no language common to the notion of specific intent
(such as “with the intent to . . .”). But it is nearly impossible to
imagine treason as a strict liability offense and it has never
been understood that way in American law. The federal
criminal law of mens rea has been inconsistent about its
rationales for requiring mens rea where it is not codified in the
statute.117 There is no federal common law of crimes (all
federal criminal law is statutory) and federal courts have been
reluctant at times to force common law notions onto
congressional legislation or federal criminal law doctrine.118
Still, federal criminal law has developed the following
principle: absent evidence that Congress intended something
to the contrary, and unless the offense falls into a category of
public welfare regulations that would permit strict liability,
courts presume Congress meant for some mens rea to apply to
federal crimes.119 This is particularly true, the Court has said,
is on other non-state actors. See Eichensehr, supra note 10, at 1491-98,
1505.
117 Compare Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) with
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). See also United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (describing the Court’s approach to
mens rea in federal cases where mens rea terms are missing from
statute).
118 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
119 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53. See also Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (stating the preference for requiring mens
rea, and that congress must clearly intend for a criminal statute to
dispense with mens rea).
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where the crime is one against the state (like treason), the
person, property, or public morals.120 So even in the absence
of an explicit mens rea element, our natural inclination would
be to interpret the Treason Clause to impose one. There is no
sound reason, then, to doubt Cramer’s explication (or that of
earlier cases from lower courts) of the law of treason as
requiring a culpable mental state.
Cramer, though, understands the word “adhering” as
necessarily embracing the mental element of intentional
betrayal. “Adherence to the enemy,” Justice Jackson said, is
the “disloyal state of mind” that the Government must
prove.121 This, presumably, is because one cannot adhere to the
enemy by anything less than a conscious object to do so. The
modern dictionary definition of adhere recognizes such a
connection between the adherent and the person who receives
the adherence, as to “give support or maintain loyalty.”122
And Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of 1755 defined adhere
primarily as “sticking to,” or “holding together,” but also as
“[t]o remain firmly fixed to a party, person, or opinion.”123
There is, therefore, support in English usage for the Court’s
understanding of the mental state that accompanies one’s
adherence to the enemy. Of course, one could argue that
Cramer and Kawakita make too much of the specific intent to
betray as a corollary of “adhering,” and that treason could be
found with something less than specific intent to betray
America. For example, one might argue that the constitutional
text stipulates only that one “adheres” to the enemy when he
aids and comforts them. Therefore, the argument goes, so
long as he actually gives aid and comfort, it matters not
whether he intends specifically to betray the United States or
simply desires some firm connection to a different group or
idea, nor would it matter whether he gives aid and comfort
only knowingly (in the sense that he is aware that is aiding an
enemy of the United States), or even recklessly (in the sense
Morrissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53.
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30.
122 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 14 (10th ed. 2002).
123 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF
THE 1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 81 (1755) (Brandi Besalke, ed.),
available at
http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=81.
120
121
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that he is subjectively at fault for consciously choosing a
course of conduct in which there is a substantial risk that he
will aid and comfort the enemy). In any of these scenarios, so
long as he remains fixed to an enemy in some way, he is by
definition adhering to the enemy and has committed treason
as the Constitution describes it. In this way, the law of treason
still resists strict liability and maintains some substantial mens
rea to accompany the relevant overt act, but is not what we
would think of as a specific intent crime. If we do not accept
“adhering” as necessarily requiring the specific intent to
betray, then this reading of the Treason Clause seems
plausible.
Hurst’s work on treason also reached the conclusion
that a specific intent to betray is an element of treason, and
cites early cases rejecting guilt for treason based on a lack of
intent to betray, yet even Hurst acknowledges authority to the
contrary.124 Hurst alludes only briefly to the disagreement in a
footnote that compares the law of treason to the law of
attempt, which requires the specific intent to carry out the
target crime.125
Hurst is correct that this is the general
approach to attempt mens rea. But, for one thing, federal
criminal law contains no general attempt statute, so there is no
congressional enactment to which we can look to draw the
comparison. Also, Hurst appears to be describing Levying
War Treason, not Adherence Treason.126 It is true that the
specific intent would be the same for criminal liability under
either theory, but because he discusses that specific intent as
deriving from the natural betrayal of allegiance that would
exist when levying war against one’s country, he does not
consider, as Cramer does, whether the specific intent to betray
constitutes a natural reading of the word “adhering.”127
Indeed, he concedes that Cramer is ambiguous about the
specific intent.128 Finally, if Hurst was looking for a criminal
law analogue to bolster the requirement of a specific intent,
attempt seems to be the wrong analogue to Adherence
Treason because the giving of aid and comfort with the
See HURST, supra note 12, at 193-203.
Id. 222-23 n.25.
126 See id. at 193 (discussing “intent” in the context of levying war).
127 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30.
128 See HURST, supra note 12, at 193, 202.
124
125
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requisite intent would complete the crime, thus taking it out of
the law of attempts.
I would suggest still another way of thinking about the
Treason Clause, and why it requires this kind of “intent,” or
purpose (or, as discussed previously, motive) to betray.
Treason has been described as an “outlier” in criminal law, at
least in the sense that it does not retain the structure of
modern criminal law.129 If that is true, then there is little
reason to think it should employ the general parts of crime
(actus reus, mens rea, causation) in the ways that modern
criminal law would. And yet, if we consider the constitutional
text closely, we see that Adherence Treason (as opposed to
Levying War Treason) bears much resemblance to the law of
complicity, and particularly the law of accomplice liability.
This is not to say that one can be an accomplice to treason or
that treason prosecutions can be based upon a theory of
derivative liability. At common law, which applied the law of
parties – now overwhelmingly abolished in American criminal
law, but with which the Framers would have been familiar –
treason was not among the crimes to which the law of parties
applied.130 Blackstone, in fact, reminds us that all who commit
treason are principals.131 Of course, that would be functionally
true under existing federal criminal law as well, as it explicitly
treats aiders and abettors as principals.132 My point, rather, is
merely to explain that there is symmetry between the law of
Adherence Treason and the law of complicity.
In our criminal law, we understand that when X aids D
in the commission of a crime, with the purpose of facilitating
D’s completion of the crime, then X is guilty of the underlying
crime on the theory of accomplice liability.133 Modern penal
codes have worked some variation into this model, but the
model itself prevails throughout American criminal law.134 Of
See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1619.
See DRESSLER, supra note 34, §30.03[A][1], at 460.
131 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35.
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
133 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, §13.2, at 708 (“It may generally be said
that one is liable as an accomplice to the crime of another if he (a)
gave assistance or encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to
prevent it (b) with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate
commission of the crime.”).
134 See id. §13.1(e), at 706-07.
129
130
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course, the mental state required for accomplice liability is a
subject of considerable debate,135 and I do not purport to
answer here the many questions that this debate raises.
Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that a consistent theme of
the prevailing legal model is that, to be guilty as an
accomplice, the one providing aid must provide it with the
purpose of facilitating or promoting or encouraging the
commission of the target offense, as well as with the mental
state required by the target offense.136 These are the so-called
dual intents of accomplice liability.137
This is true under existing federal law, as well. Federal
accomplice liability is governed by statute, section 2 of Title 18,
which provides that “[w]hoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”138
Although the federal law of accomplice mens rea has been
uneven, it has been generally agreed that the defendant must
“intend” that the target crime be committed (though, again,
there is considerable dispute about what “intent” means in
this context – whether it requires the purpose that the target
crime be committed, or simply knowledge that the assistance
will aid the commission of the target crime).139 In Judge
Hand’s words, the aider and abettor must have “associated
himself with the venture, participated in it as in something he
wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it
succeed.”140 The Supreme Court, in fact, recently reaffirmed
Id. §13.2(b), at 712-13. See also Baruch Weiss, What Were They
Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer
Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (analyzing
federal case law); John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for
Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237
(2008) (analyzing various state law approaches); Grace Mueller,
Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2169,
2172 (1988) (discussing various theories).
136 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.05, at 469-70.
137 Id. at 469.
138 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
139 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 13.2(b)-(d), at 712-18.
140 United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 1938). The Peoni
decision has been subject to question. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey,
Reading Rosemond, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 239 n.23 (2014); Weiss,
supra note 135, at 1424.
135
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this standard and its kinship to the common law of accomplice
liability.141 Moreover, even under the law of accomplice
liability, knowledge does not foreclose a finding of intent.
Courts can sometimes infer intent from knowledge.142 And to
complicate matters further, there is authority, in federal
criminal law as well, for the proposition that accomplice
liability can be found where the accomplice simply has
knowledge that her aid will facilitate a crime.143 Again,
though, the point is not to resolve the debate over mens rea of
federal accomplice liability. The point, rather, is that because
the constitutional text speaks in terms of “aiding” another (the
enemy), there is a natural relationship between the Treason
Clause and the law of accomplice liability, the law of aiding
another. Understanding Adherence Treason as a species of
complicity – or at least as a close cousin – may help improve
our understanding of the Treason Clause and how it functions
in the modern world of criminal law.
Both Cramer and Kawakita, in fact, use language that
only amplifies the sounds of complicity doctrine that
accompany the Treason Clause. In Cramer, the Court speaks
in terms that remind us of the dual intents.144 And although
Hurst criticized the Cramer Court’s conclusion that the

See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). This is not
to say that Rosemond definitively answers problems related to the
mens rea of accomplice liability. See Garvey, supra note 140, at 23850.
142 A well-known case on this subject (though it appears in the
conspiracy context) is People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), in which the operator of telephone answering
service permitted participants in a prostitution ring to use his
service, knowing that the service was used for this purpose. The
court explained the circumstances under which intent may be
inferred from knowledge, id. at 478-81, but that none of those
circumstances existed in Lauria’s case because he had no special
interest or stake in the success of the prostitution venture. Id. at 48283.
143 See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, modified, 777 F.2d
345 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Campisi, 306 F.2d 308 (2nd Cir.
1962). See also Weiss, supra note 135, at 1396-1409 (analyzing federal
case law on knowledge).
144 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 31.
141
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treasonous overt act must actually aid the enemy,145 that
particular reading of the Treason Clause – whatever the other
shortcomings of the Cramer opinion – would at least be
consistent with the common law understanding of aid for
accomplice liability, which required that the accomplice’s aid
in fact assist the principal.146 Moreover, in Kawakita, the Court
explained that Adherence Treason does not require that the
overt act be one that turns the tide in the enemy’s efforts, or
even that it be one of great significance to the enemy.147 The
overt act can be insubstantial and have little or no ultimate
effect on the war effort against the United States.148 So long as
the aid that the traitor provides would, at a minimum,
embolden the enemy in its efforts, the aid is sufficient for
treason (when joined with the relevant treasonous intent).149
A parallel principle exists in the law of accomplice liability.
The aid need not be significant.150 Rather, even trivial
assistance or even mere psychological encouragement,
combined with the relevant specific intent, is sufficient for
guilt on a theory of accomplice liability.151
The Snowden affair offers an example of how this
principle functions. Because of the scope of the information
that he disclosed, and the likelihood that this information
reached an American enemy (ISIS, al Qaeda, etc.), it is
certainly plausible to think that the disclosure aided them.152
See HURST, supra note 12, at 210. See also Crane, supra note 13, at
654-56 (surveying scholarly criticism of Justice Jackson’s Cramer
opinion).
146 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.04[B][1], at 467.
147 See Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738.
148 Id. The Court also cited Haupt, saying that “harboring the spy in
Haupt v. United States . . . was also insignificant in the total war effort
of Germany during the recent war. Yet it was a treasonable act.” Id.
149 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 13.2(a), at 708-09 (describing how
encouragement may allow guilt on accomplice liability theory).
150 See United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996).
151 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.04[B][1], at 467. The law of trivial
assistance has come under fire. See Joshua Dressler, Reforming
Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 427 (2008).
152 See James Gordon Meek, et al., Intel Heads: Edward Snowden Did
‘Profound Damage’ to U.S. Security, ABC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), available
at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/intel-heads-edward-snowden145
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Even if the disclosure did not directly result in any American
casualties, or even have any significant role in an enemy
attack, the disclosures at least could have emboldened the
enemy or strengthened the enemy’s fortitude in planning or
perhaps even executing an attack. And yet, again, in the
absence of an intent that the enemy launch a successful attack,
the aid that the disclosures provided would not be treasonous
aid and comfort. The Snowden example, in fact, shows how
the overlap of treason law with complicity law would resolve
the knowledge/purpose debate. That is, even if Snowden was
aware (had knowledge) that his actions would aid the enemy
(and this is a fair bet), he still would not be guilty of treason
because he lacked the specific purpose to betray.
But think about a different example. Imagine an
American citizen who decides to join the cause of, for instance,
al Qaeda or ISIS. He or she then communicates information
digitally – such as via YouTube, Twitter, email, or posted on a
personal blog – so that the enemy could have easy access to it,
indeed, with the hope that the enemy would gain access to it
for purposes of planning an attack or doing some harm to
America or its security interests. This could be sensitive
national security information to which the person has access
(like the information Snowden disclosed), or it could be other
information that may benefit those enemy groups in planning
or executing an attack. It could even be information pledging
support for the terrorist cause and a hope for the killing of
Americans, or the destruction of the United States. If the
enemy never sees or receives the communication, then even
though the citizen intended to betray America, a treason
prosecution is likely barred. It offered no aid. As in the
common law of accomplice liability, attempted aid is
insufficient for proving guilt, unless the attempted aid is
known to the principal actor and thus serves as
encouragement.153 The overt act must actually offer some aid
and comfort.
The Constitution does not mandate significant aid and
comfort, however. So if the enemy receives and sees or hears
profound-damage-us-security/story?id=22285388 (describing views
of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, and John
Brennan, CIA Director).
153 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, §13.2(a), at 712.
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the communication, and even if the information merely
encourages them or bolsters their fortitude to harm America
or is otherwise only minimally helpful to their cause, this is
arguably treasonous (assuming, of course, satisfaction of the
constitutional proof requirements).154 The same could be said
of Americans who have taken affirmative steps to not only
indicate their support for ISIS, but to personally, and more
directly, assist ISIS.155 Even if those citizens never actually
reached a destination in which they would fight alongside
other ISIS cohorts, the key question is whether the steps they
have taken to join ISIS fighters would encourage ISIS in its
mission. These are somewhat closer cases, at least where the
person has not actually reached the point of actual fighting or
other direct aid beyond expressions of support or
encouragement for the terrorists.
Material support for
terrorism (or conspiracy to provide it, or attempt to provide it)
offers a clearer legal basis for prosecution,156 and indeed, that
has been the charge of choice for federal prosecutors in those
cases.157 But many of the acts that constitute material support
See Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738. See also Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at
126 (“[i]f war actually be levied, . . . all those who perform any part,
however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and
who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be
considered as traitors.”).
155 See, e.g., More young Americans arrested for joining ISIS, AOL (Mar.
4, 2015, 11:10 PM), http://www.aol.com/article/2015/03/04/moreyoung-americans-arrested-for-joining-isis/21149844/ (noting
comments by James Clapper that about 180 Americans have traveled
to Syria to fight alongside ISIS); Elizabeth Whitman, Americans
Joining ISIS: Arrests Suggest Young Muslims Lured by Social Media,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015, 3:22 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/americans-joining-isis-arrests-suggestyoung-muslims-lured-social-media-1828286 (noting various citizens
or American residents who have tried to join ISIS); How many
Americans have joined ISIS?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 22, 2014, 2:09 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-many-americans-havejoined-isis/.
156 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012).
157 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Philadelphia Woman
Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 3,
2015); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Madison, Wisconsin Man
Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL (Apr.
9, 2015); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fourth Brooklyn, New
154
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would also likely constitute “aid and comfort” for purposes of
Adherence Treason.158 So prosecutors should not rule out the
possibility of treason, based on the complicity theory
articulated here.159 Notice, though, how these scenarios differ
significantly from the Snowden affair – they, unlike the
Snowden affair, couple assistance (and an intent to render the
assistance) with an intent to betray.
Though the parallels are there, the Court – in its few
treason cases – has not discussed the law of Adherence
Treason in these accomplice liability terms. And the parallels
are admittedly imperfect, chiefly because we do not prosecute
Adherence Treason on a theory of complicity. Accomplice
liability is derivative, and treason liability is always direct.
Adherence, with the provision of aid and comfort, is the crime.
Nonetheless, we see that there are important parallels between
Adherence Treason and complicity law – especially the law of
accomplice liability, an older version of which the Framers
would have known – that may explain the outcomes in both
Cramer and Kawakita and help us better approach future
problems involving the nature of one’s aid to the enemy and
the mental state that must accompany that aid. This is
especially true at time when, thanks to digital technology
accessible anywhere in the world, aiding or encouraging the
enemy can be easy, instantaneous, and potentially quite
harmful to American institutions and interests.

IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever else Edward Snowden is guilty of, he is most
likely not guilty of treason. That does not mean that we, and
our political leaders with us, should not condemn his conduct.
Rather, it simply means that we should endeavor to be more
accurate in our use of treason as serious political rhetoric and
more conscientious about developing a complete – or, as
York Resident Charged with Attempt and Conspiracy to Provide
Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 6, 2015).
158 See 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b) (2012) (broadly defining “material
support”).
159 Cf. Eichensehr, supra note 10, at 1503-05 (arguing that, in
balancing advantages and disadvantages of treason prosecutions for
assisting non-state actors, often the benefits will outweigh the risks).
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complete as can be expected, given the complexity and nature
of it – understanding of American treason law. American
treason is supposed to be hard to prove, hard to prosecute,
and hard to punish. Yet where it exists, as the Constitution
defines it, federal prosecutors should be more ready to enforce
it and to seek severe punishment for it. Modern technology
and social media, and the demonstrated willingness of some
Americans to join forces with modern terrorists, could make
treason prosecutions more plausible than they have been in
American history. As the Snowden affair reveals, however,
treason against the United States requires that only with the
confluence of a sufficiently guilty act and guilty mind devoted
to betraying America will a treason prosecution represent a
constitutionally acceptable legal response to conduct that
harms American national security and the institutions of
American government.
Merely doing harm to American
interests may be criminal, but it is not necessarily treasonous.
This might make us inclined to broaden American treason, for
broadening treason law might make it easier for us to allege
and prove treason with respect to Americans who do harm to
American institutions and interests by aiding our enemies.
And it might make us feel better about having a criminal law
that comports with our rhetorical and psychological
sensibilities about disloyalty.
But doing so would be
inconsistent with the narrow and limited version of treason
that the founding generation – which well understood the
politics and consequences of disloyalty – not only desired, but
provided in the constitutional text. Weakening the limits on
American treason could undermine the delicate balance that
the Constitution has struck to ensure sober use of the federal
power to punish treachery against the Nation.
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GOVERNMENT SECRETS:
THE PUBLIC’S MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE SNOWDEN
DISCLOSURES
Melanie Reid*
“Secrets, silent, stony sit in the dark palaces of both our hearts:
secrets weary of their tyranny: tyrants willing to be
dethroned.”
--James Joyce

I. INTRODUCTION
Human beings are curious by nature. We love to ask
the “why” questions and would rather be privy to a secret
than be kept in the dark. Not surprisingly, government
conspiracy theories are quite popular.1 It is much more
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1 JFK (Warner Bros. 1991) (US Gross Box Office = $70,405,498)
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102138/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus;
CONSPIRACY THEORY (Warner Bros. 1997) (US Gross Box Office =
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interesting to think part of the government was somehow
involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
rather than believe the lone gunman theory, or that the
government is covering up an alien invasion by storing UFOs
and alien bodies at Area 51 in Roswell rather than believe no
such thing exists.2
Thus, when Edward Snowden revealed that one of the
government’s most secretive agencies, the National Security
Agency (“NSA”), previously nicknamed “No Such Agency,”
was keeping a huge secret from the American people and
monitoring American citizens’ phone calls, instant messaging,
emails, documents kept in the “cloud,” contact lists,
metadata,3 GPS data, etc., this became one of the greatest
government conspiracy theories to contemplate since JFK and
Roswell.
Is the NSA listening to my phone call right now? What
if I say the word “president” or “al Qaeda,” would they
definitely be listening then? Or what if I “Google” one of
these words? Would the NSA instantly watch what websites I
am viewing?
Of course, it would be extremely difficult to keep such
a large-scale government conspiracy under wraps. It seems
$76,081,498)
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118883/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus.
2 Journalist Annie Jacobsen surmised that the UFOs and aliens found
in Roswell, Nevada in 1947 were actually Russian children around
12-years-old with large heads and abnormally shaped, over-sized
eyes that were the genetic experiments of Josef Mengele, a former
German Nazi officer and physician in Auschwitz. ANNIE JACOBSEN,
AREA 51: AN UNCENSORED HISTORY OF AMERICA’S TOP SECRET
MILITARY BASE 2011. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted to cause
hysteria in America with the thought of “UFOs and an alien
invasion.” Id.
3 Metadata, or transactional information, is collected as phone calls
“are handed over, as is location data, call duration, unique
identifiers, and the time and duration of all calls. The contents of the
conversation itself are not covered.” Glenn Greenwald, NSA
collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, THE
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order. The "business records" provision of the
PATRIOT Act (50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2014)) has been used as a legal
justification for bulk collection of domestic telephone records. Id.
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surprising that any top-secret classified government operation
is kept a secret. Ben Franklin’s famous quote, “[t]hree may
keep a secret, if two of them are dead,”4 might sound
melodramatic but it rings true. Not much is kept secret
anymore – in fact, there appears to be more and more
disclosures as spies, whistleblowers, journalists, and insiders
begin to share their knowledge and spread it throughout the
internet. The public clamors it has a need-to-know in order to
keep the government in check.
But what is it we need to know? Do we need to know
the specifics as to how individual NSA collection programs
work?
Should the public know which communication
methods are being intercepted by the NSA and thus
compromised, or what foreign embassies and consulates are
being surveilled both inside and outside of the U.S., or how
electronic beacons are implanted within targeted electronic
devices, or how the NSA taps into the telecommunications of
service providers, or know about U.S. collection priorities
against foreign countries?
Once the initial reporting on the Snowden leak began
in June 2013, the media and public wanted to know more –
what was the NSA collecting, what were they listening to,
what were they doing with this information, who are they
sharing this information with? The actual legalities and
illegalities of certain NSA programs and collection of data
became more blurred as the media focused on the wide-scale
public outrage at the idea that the government was spying on
its own citizens regardless of the legalities. The media
emphasized the public’s ever-increasing distrust of
government and the intelligence community’s (IC)5 classified
programs.
Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanack (1735), available at
http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/prichard35.html. A student of
mine recently informed me this is also the theme to a show entitled,
“Pretty Little Liars.”
5 “The Intelligence Community (IC) is a group of Executive Branch
agencies and organizations that work separately and together to
engage in intelligence activities that are necessary for the conduct of
foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the
United States.” OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, U.S.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: AN OVERVIEW 7 (2011), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.
4
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Now that the initial deluge of classified information
from Snowden’s leaks has been disclosed, the questions are
two-fold: (1) are these expansive collection programs by the IC
legal or illegal and (2) if legal, are these “whistleblower”
disclosures justified given the resultant damage these leaks
have caused to our national security and law enforcement’s
ability to prevent the commission of future crimes?

II. LEGALITY OF IC’S ACTIONS
What is difficult to determine from the recent media
disclosures is what exactly is being collected, how is the
information collected, at what point can communications be
accessed and analyzed, who receives the analysis, and what is
the legal justification for each step along this process. There is
a significant distinction between authorizations to collect
telephone caller identification record information, or “to” and
“from” information on a particular email address, versus
authorization to listen in on the content of such
communications. If this distinction is not made clear, then the
public can draw erroneous conclusions about alleged breaches
of privacy based upon misinformation.

A. NSA’S BULK COLLECTION OF METADATA: SECTION 215
Snowden disclosed that the NSA is collecting the
metadata from millions and even billions of phone calls and
emails sent out every day, including Americans’ emails and
pdf. Sixteen United States intelligence agencies comprise the IC and
are under the Office of the Director of the National Intelligence: the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) National Security Branch, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) Office of National Security Intelligence,
Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and Army,
Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Naval Intelligence. See id.
at 9.
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phone calls.6 Metadata includes “much of the information that
appears on a customer’s telephone bill: the date and time of a
call, its duration, and the participating telephone numbers”
and can include the nature of “how the call was routed from
one participant to the other through the infrastructure of the
telephone companies’ networks.”7
The NSA was given this power when the PATRIOT
Act was passed post-9/11.8 Section 215 of the Act allows the
government to obtain a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC or FISA court) order every ninety days requiring
third parties (including telecommunications providers) to
hand over any records or other “tangible thing” if deemed
“relevant” to “any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”9
The NSA utilized this “Access to Certain Business
Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism
Investigations” power to justify their bulk telephone records
collection program.10 The NSA began to collect metadata from
all sorts of third parties, including telecommunications carriers
and internet providers, in order to have the information close
GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE
NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 30-32 (2014).
7 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT
ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT 8, 21 (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB
TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT], available at
http://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.
8 Id.
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT
Act) Act of 2001, sec 208(1), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf., at sec. 215. See also BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, ARE THEY ALLOWED TO DO THAT? A
BREAKDOWN OF SELECTED GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 1
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Gover
nment%20Surveillance%20Factsheet.pdf.
10 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
6
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at hand when it came time to conduct a targeted search.11 The
NSA stores these collected telephone records in a centralized
database.12 Before an analyst can access the database and
search for a specific number or selection term, “one of twentytwo designated NSA officials must first determine there is a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number is associated
with terrorism.”13 Once the analyst gains approval, he or she
“may run queries that will return the calling records for that
seed [number], and permit ‘contact chaining’ to develop a
fuller picture of the seed’s contacts. Contact chaining enables
analysts to retrieve not only the numbers directly in contact
with the seed number (“the first hop”), but also numbers in
contact with all first hop numbers (the “second hop”), as well
as all numbers in contact with all second hop numbers (the
“third hop”).”14
The government’s argument is that one cannot
investigate and prevent terrorist attacks without real-time
access to metadata to determine who is contacting whom and
when. “When the NSA identifies communications that may be
associated with terrorism, it issues intelligence reports to other
federal agencies, such as the FBI, that work to prevent terrorist
attacks.”15 It is difficult to predict when attacks may occur,
even more so if one hand is tied behind the IC’s back when not
given the ability to follow a target’s phone number trail
wherever that might lead.
Critics of section 215 argue that by permitting
intelligence agencies, specifically the NSA, to collect metadata
from a variety of third parties, section 215 allows the
government to get a whole picture of a person by searching
one’s “financial, library, travel, video rental, phone, medical,
church, synagogue, and mosque records . . . providing the
government says it’s trying to protect against terrorism.”16
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
13 Id. at 8-9.
14 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 8.
16 Emma Roller, This Is What Section 215 of the Patriot Act Does, SLATE
(June 7, 2013, 1:17 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/06/07/nsa_prism_scan
dal_what_patriot_act_section_215_does.html.
11
12
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Metadata, “if properly exploited, could yield more valuable
information than recordings of the phone calls or email
messages themselves.”17
Critics further argue that “[i]t is difficult to believe that
the phone records of millions of Americans are actually
‘relevant’ to a specific terrorist or foreign intelligence
investigation. Nor does Section 215 appear to allow the
government to collect first and determine relevance later,
which is what the government claims it is doing.”18
In January 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB)19 issued a report after reviewing the
NSA’s bulk collection of phone records. The PCLOB found
the bulk collection of phone records failed to comply with
Section 215 and therefore should be terminated or significantly
revised.20 The PCLOB determined (1) the bulk telephone
records acquired had “no connection to any specific FBI
investigation at the time of their collection;” (2) since the
records are collected in bulk, they are not “relevant” to a
particular investigation as required under section 215; (3)
requiring telephone companies to furnish new call records on
a daily basis is not permitted under section 215 nor FISA; and
(4) section 215 only permits the FBI and not the NSA to obtain
records relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence
investigation.21
That same month, President Obama made his own
comments regarding the section 215 program, stating he
would continue to allow government use of bulk phone
records while they attempt to come up with an alternative
SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S
SURVEILLANCE STATE 204-05 (Penguin Books, 2011).
18 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3.
19 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was
established in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. In 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act
restructured the Board requiring that all five members be appointed
by the President. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(e) (2012 & Supp. 2014).
As a result, the Board did not fully exist until June 2013, after the
Senate confirmed members to resume operations. PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://www.pclob.gov/about-us
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
20 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
21 Id.
17
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solution “without the government holding this metadata
itself” and would require the agency to get court approval
prior to accessing the metadata.22 The NSA would also no
longer be able to access records that go beyond two persons
removed from the original query.23
In response to these findings, in May 2014, the House
passed the USA Freedom Act24 which focuses on the NSA’s
call-records program in which the agency retains billions of
records for all phone calls made from or to the United States.
Under the legislation, telecommunications companies would
retain those records, and the NSA would only have access to
specific information about targeted individuals under court
orders.25 A year later, due to inaction by the Senate, the bulk
collection program under section 215 was allowed to expire on
June 1, 2015.26 The Senate then approved the USA Freedom
Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech on NSA Reforms,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-presidentobamas-jan-17-speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
23 Id.
24 USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361.
25 Id. The bill “[r]equires the FBI to include in such tangible thing
applications a specific selection term to be used as the basis for such
production.” Id. A “specific selection term” is “a term specifically
identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device” that is
“used by the government to limit the scope of the information or
tangible things sought pursuant to the statute.” Id. In each
application requesting call detail records (i.e., telephone numbers
and time or duration of a call), the FBI must show “(1) reasonable
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced
based on the specific selection term are relevant to such
investigation; and (2) facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that such specific selection term is associated with a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” Id.
26 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 2. See also Erin Kelly, Here’s what happens now that the
Patriot Act Provisions Expired, USA Today, June 1, 2015,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/31/patrio
t-act-expires-senate-stalemate/28260905/.
22
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Act on June 2nd, and the revised Section 215 program which
effectively eliminates bulk collection will continue until
December 15, 2019.27 The USA Freedom Act allows the bulk
collection of telephone metadata for only a 180 day transition
period (until November 29, 2015) during which such collection
could continue.28

B. NSA’S MONITORING OF CONVERSATIONS: FISA AND
SECTION 702
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act addresses the bulk
collection of telephone records, and the FISA Amendments of
2008 (FAA) address the collection and subsequent analysis of
the content of telephone and internet communications.29 The
FAA (also known as section 702) has been utilized to allow the
NSA to work with electronic communication service providers
“to copy, scan, and filter internet and phone traffic coming
through their physical infrastructure” and compel the
disclosure of the content of such communications so long as it
targets foreign persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States.30 No particular warrant is required
in that instance. The targeting of the non-U.S. person on
foreign soil must be conducted in order to acquire foreign
Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 2-3 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 705(a)).
28 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 10-11 (citing to section 109(a) of the USA FREEDOM Act).
29 H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS110hr6304enr.pdf.
30 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION REGARDING SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AMENDMENTS ACT TO THE PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD 8 (Apr. 22, 2014), available at
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/22/eff_pclob_comments_11_ap
ril_2014.pdf; See also H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS110hr6304enr.pdf.
27
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intelligence information as defined in FISA, and the NSA must
obtain approval from the FISA court as to their targeting and
minimization procedures prior to collection to make sure U.S.
persons are not inadvertently intercepted.31
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to separate the
collection of phone and internet communications of strictly
foreign persons from U.S. persons if the foreign person is
communicating with a U.S. person.32 These communications
are also potentially being copied and stored in a searchable
database.33 Information on U.S. persons may incidentally be
collected if that U.S. person communicates with a non-U.S.
person that is being targeted or two non-U.S. persons discuss
the U.S. person.34 Or, a U.S. person’s conversation may
inadvertently be collected by mistake if erroneously targeted
by the NSA and thought to be a non-U.S. person.35 In the case
of inadvertent collection, the communications must be
destroyed.36
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
(PCLOB) approved of the Section 702 program in its report
dated July 2, 2014, stating:
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 6 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter
PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT], available at
https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/pclob_section_702_repo
rt.pdf. “The targeting procedures govern how the executive branch
determines that a particular person is reasonably believed to be a
non-U.S. person located outside the United States, and that targeting
this person will lead to the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information. The minimization procedures cover the acquisition,
retention, use, and dissemination of any non-publicly available U.S.
person information acquired through the Section 702 program.” Id.
at 6-7. “For example, the NSA’s minimization procedures require
that queries of Section 702-acquired information be designed so that
they are ‘reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence
information.’” Id. at 8.
32 JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 304 (Anchor Books,
2009).
33 Id.
34 PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
35 Id.
36 Id.
31
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[t]he Section 702 program has enabled the
government to acquire a greater range of
foreign intelligence than it otherwise would
have been able to obtain – and to do so quickly
and effectively.
Compared with the
“traditional” FISA process under Title I of the
statute, Section 702 imposes significantly fewer
limits on the government . . . [t]he program has
proven valuable in the government’s efforts to
combat terrorism as well as in other areas of
foreign intelligence. . . . [m]onitoring terrorist
networks under Section 702 has enabled the
government to learn how they operate, and to
understand their priorities, strategies, and
tactics.37
While the core of the section 702 program was deemed
to be “reasonable” under Fourth Amendment law, the PCLOB
set forth additional proposals to address their concerns about
the unknown and potentially large scope of the
incidental
collection
of
U.S.
persons’
communications, the use of “about” collection
to acquire Internet communications that are
neither to nor from the target of surveillance,
and the use of queries to search for the
communications of specific U.S. persons within
the information that has been collected.38
On June 19, 2014, the House passed a bill that includes
an amendment which bars the NSA, the CIA, and others in the
IC from actually examining the communications of Americans
that were collected into databases created to target
foreigners.39 Critics have called this technique the “backdoor

Id. at 9-10.
PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
39 H.R. 5016, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/housebill/5016/amendments.
37
38
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search loophole.”40 “The bill also prohibits the government
from requiring a private company to alter its software to allow
clandestine surveillance.”41

C. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS TO IC ACTIONS
In summary, upon review of FISA, the FAA, and the
PATRIOT Act, it would be lawful for the NSA to monitor
electronic communications of foreign persons reasonably
believed42 to be located overseas without any type of warrant.
However, if that person is a “U.S. person” or that foreign
person was to communicate with a person located in the
United States, the NSA would need to apply for a FISA
warrant. The difficulty is in determining where the particular
person is located at the time of the call. While the law does
not allow the intentional monitoring of U.S. persons, the FISC
approves minimization procedures to limit the amount of
information about U.S. persons that is intercepted, retained,
and disseminated. Hence, the IC’s monitoring of content in
communications is legal.
On the other hand, the legality of the NSA’s collection
of metadata is uncertain. While the NSA had previously used
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to justify its bulk records

Charlie Savage, House Votes to Curb N.S.A. Scrutiny of Americans’
Communications, NY TIMES (June 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/us/politics/house-votes-tocurb-nsa-scrutiny-of-americans-communications.html.
41 Andrew Rosenthal, The House Actually Did Something About
Warrantless Surveillance, TAKING NOTE: THE EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR’S
BLOG (June 20, 2014, 1:30 PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/the-houseactually-did-something-about-warrantless-surveillance/.
42 “[T]he NSA has reportedly interpreted that to mean that it need
only ensure ’51 percent confidence of the target’s ‘foreignness.’”
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3; See also Barton
Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British intelligence mining data from
nine U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program, WASH. POST (June
6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/usintelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broadsecret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html.
40
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collection program,43 it is now clear that the NSA has been
collecting more than foreign persons’ metadata and metadata
not necessarily relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence
investigation.44
Regardless, the bulk data collection of
business records and other tangible things, as we know it, will
terminate after November 29, 2015.45 After such date, the IC
will have to furnish “specific selection term[s]” to the FISC
before being granted access to such metadata from third party
communications providers.46 However, at the time of the
Snowden leak, both the monitoring of content and the bulk
records collection program were legally justified.

III. SNOWDEN’S REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE VERSUS DAMAGE
DONE TO NATIONAL SECURITY
A. BULK COLLECTION AND KEEPING THE INTERNET
“FREE”
Snowden’s real complaint seems to boil down to the
NSA’s collection of metadata – not the subsequent analysis of
this data because targeting and minimization procedures have
been put in place to avoid bulk analysis of the data collected.
Therefore, Snowden is concerned about the potential for abuse
in the collection of metadata not necessarily current abuse of
power now that this data is in the hands of the NSA.

50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2014).
Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted
Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsaintercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreignerswho-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-85724b1b969b6322_story.html?hpid=z1.
45 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 18.
46 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 10 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 103(b), amending FISA
§ 501(c)).
43
44
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Snowden has given several interviews and written
manifestos explaining why the public needs to know the
specifics as to what the NSA is collecting and how they are
collecting it. In Snowden’s eyes, only with the public’s input
can true regulation and accountability take place.47
Apparently, congressional oversight committees, the FISC, the
Department of Justice, internal agency auditing and
monitoring, and oversight from the Executive branch is not
enough. It bears reminding that the previously described
collection and surveillance programs are regulated – by
Congress, by the FISC, by the Department of Justice and by
oversight lawyers within intelligence agencies themselves.48
Snowden wants to keep the internet free from NSA
collection – so that those who grow up on the internet feel free
to explore, make mistakes, and express themselves without
fear that anyone is watching.49 Unfortunately, regardless of
whether the NSA is watching, others are and will always be
watching. Private companies make it their mission to collect as
much information as possible on individual consumers and
sell it to the highest commercial bidder. Criminals both
overseas and in our own back yard who want to steal our
information are monitoring and exploiting the Internet as well.
Director of the FBI, James Comey, recently stated,
GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 13, 30-31.
At a recent debate, former CIA director James Woolsey stated,
I have seen, either from in the Executive
Branch, or as a private citizen interested in
these issues and following them, the
oversight personnel capabilities, numbers of
offices, numbers of people involved in
overseeing the American system of
intelligence is truly awesome. There is no
country anywhere in the world that has the
massive oversight from legislative, judicial,
and executive sides and functions over their
intelligence systems. Nobody is even close
to the United States.
Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, Snowden was
justified, (Feb. 12, 2014), available at
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/images/debates/past/transcripts
/021214%20Snowden.pdf.
49 GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 46-47.
47
48
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I think there's something about sitting in front
of your own computer working on your own
banking, your own health care, your own social
life that makes it hard to understand the danger
(of third party surveillance, cybercrime, and
cyber-attacks on companies and individuals on
the internet). I mean, the Internet is the most
dangerous parking lot imaginable. But if you
were crossing a mall parking lot late at night,
your entire sense of danger would be
heightened. You would stand straight. You'd
walk quickly. You'd know where you were
going. You would look for light. Folks are
wandering around that proverbial parking lot
of the Internet all day long, without giving it a
thought to whose attachments they're opening,
what sites they're visiting. And that makes it
easy for the bad guys.50
The Internet, unfortunately, will never be free from
surveillance. Even if our government is not monitoring the
Internet, there will always be a myriad of bad actors that do.
Foreign Intelligence Services target the Internet to collect
positive intelligence and steal trade secrets, cyber criminals
hack into our private e-mails and steal personal identification
information, terrorist organizations promote jihad and the
destruction of our cyber infrastructure.
More importantly, do we want our government to be
proactive and attempt to prevent or disrupt terrorist attacks
before they take place? If the answer is yes, then we need to
provide federal law enforcement with a requisite amount of
surveillance tools to be able to accomplish this mission.

Transcript of Interview by Scott Pelley with James Comey, Oct. 5,
2014, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-directorjames-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cybercrime/.
50
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B. BULK COLLECTION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE OF
POWER
Snowden’s argument for public disclosure would be
much stronger if he could point to specific abuses of power
that would liken current NSA activities to those abuses
disclosed in the 1970’s during the Church Committee hearings.
The Church Committee discovered that the IC had illegally
gathered information and compiled files on communists in the
1950s and civil rights groups and Vietnam War protesters in
the 1960s.51 These findings resulted in a significant overhaul in
IC oversight and accountability and the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 in order to prevent
future abuse of power by the IC.52
In addition to his concerns about NSA spying on
Americans through its bulk collection programs, Snowden
also disclosed examples of individual government employees
who abused the power and responsibility placed in their
hands. This abuse of power was illegal, and the offenders
should have faced criminal or severe administrative penalties,
but their behavior in many instances was either condoned or
overlooked. In one article, Snowden is quoted as saying,
Many of the people searching through the
haystacks were young, enlisted guys, 18 to 22
years old. They’ve suddenly been thrust into a
position of extraordinary responsibility, where
they now have access to all your private
records. In the course of their daily work, they
stumble across something that is completely
unrelated in any sort of necessary sense – for
example, an intimate nude photo of someone in
a sexually compromising situation. But they’re
extremely attractive. So what do they do? They
turn around in their chair and they show a coUNITED STATES SENATE, Senate History: January 27, 1975 Church
Committee Created,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Church_Co
mmittee_Created.htm.
52 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1793 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 1811 (2014)).
51
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worker. And their co-worker says, “Oh, hey,
that’s great. Send that to Bill down the way,”
and then Bill sends it to George, George sends it
to Tom, and sooner or later this person’s whole
life has been seen by all of these other people.
The analysts don’t discuss such things in the
NSA cafeterias, but back in the office anything
goes, more or less. You’re in a vaulted space.
Everybody has sort of similar clearances,
everybody knows everybody. It’s a small
world. It’s never reported, because the auditing
of these systems is incredibly weak. The fact
that records of your intimate moments have
been taken from your private communication
stream, from the intended recipient, and given
to the government, without any specific
authorisation, without any specific need, is
itself a violation of your rights. [When asked
how often do such things happen?] . . . I’d say
probably every two months. It’s routine
enough. These are seen as sort of the fringe
benefits of surveillance positions.53
Everyone would agree that NSA analysts should not be
opening private email attachments that contain naked photos
(or any non-foreign intelligence related material for that
matter) and sending them to their colleagues. This is illegal
and there should be repercussions. But was exposure of
childish behavior by a few analysts of such significance to
outweigh the damage done to our nation’s security due to
Snowden’s disclosures?
Other reasons why Snowden made such disclosures
include: (1) disgust over CIA operatives who would get
targets drunk enough to land in jail and then bail them out in
order to recruit an asset,54 (2) Clapper lying in a congressional
Alan Rusbridger & Ewan Macaskill, I, Spy: Edward Snowden in
Exile, THE GUARDIAN, July 19, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edwardsnowden-interview-rusbridger-macaskill.
54 James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 13,
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/.
53
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hearing about whether the NSA collects data on Americans,55
(3) military and CIA drones and targeted killings,56 (4) outrage
over the NSA’s “ability to map the movement of everyone in a
city by monitoring their MAC address, a unique identifier
emitted by every cell phone, computer, and other electronic
device,”57 (5) NSA’s access to email and other Internet traffic
from Syria during the civil war,58 (6) the NSA’s building of a
Massive Data Repository where “billions of phone calls, faxes,
emails, computer-to-computer data transfers, and text
messages from around the world [would] flow through the
MDR every hour,”59 and (7) the NSA’s access to virtually all
private communications coming in from overseas to people in
the US in order to “identify these malicious traffic flows and
respond to them.”60
Again, the resounding concern is collection, and the
fact that the public is not told about the mass collection. As
mentioned, some of Snowden’s complaints had nothing to do
with bulk collection. Snowden did have a list of individual
government employees whose actions merited administrative
action and reprimand, but their specific activity did not
undermine the legality or wisdom of the programs which
Snowden was actually railing against. Snowden has certainly
been successful at opening the dialogue as to bulk collection –
as everyone is now discussing collection, how to reform or
eliminate section 215, and how to move collection from
government’s hands to a third party.61
At a congressional hearing on March 12, 2014, Senator Ron Wyden
asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, “Does the
NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of
millions of Americans?” Clapper responded, “No sir . . . not
wittingly.” Fred Kaplan, Fire James Clapper, SLATE, June 11, 2013,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/20
13/06/fire_dni_james_clapper_he_lied_to_congress_about_nsa_surv
eillance.html.
56 Bamford, supra note 54.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Would a third party’s (telecommunications company) employees
perform better than government employees and abuse their power
much less than government employees that undergo background
55
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Transparency is important to a certain degree. It keeps
the government honest and it ensures the public can keep tabs
on the checks and balances that are put in place to ensure
abuse does not occur. But too much transparency defeats the
very purpose of clandestine intelligence operations in the first
place, i.e., to protect the American public and keep the bad
guys in the dark as to our intentions and capabilities. The
general public has already been informed as to the purpose
and mission of the NSA, plus a vague description of NSA
collection platforms and capabilities is readily available. Once
you delve into the details such as specific methods and
sources, and the identities of certain targets, then this
information becomes sensitive and classified, and as such,
should be available to only those who are trusted and have a
legitimate need to know. It may be advisable to have an open
discussion on collection but there is no need to go into details
that are classified, since such disclosures could cause harm to
national security. Whistleblowers certainly need to step
forward to discuss abuse within the system, especially when
these failures are not being addressed by oversight committees
within or outside the IC agencies. Certainly, on an individual
level, when government analysts are caught monitoring calls
and opening attachments that are not relevant to an
authorized investigation, these people need to be brought to
the attention of that agency’s internal security team. However,
there are multiple administrative layers of authority, policy
review officials and security personnel available to anyone
concerned who earnestly wants to report wrong doing or
illegal activity.
One concern raised by Snowden is the allegation that
the NSA “has been gathering records of online sexual activity
and evidence of visits to pornographic websites as part of a
proposed plan to harm the reputations of those whom the
agency believes are radicalizing others [to become devoted to
the jihadist cause] through incendiary speeches.”62 The six

checks and significant vetting before being granted top secret
clearances?
62 Glenn Greenwald, Ryan Grim, & Ryan Gallagher, Top Secret
Document Reveals NSA Spied on Porn Habits as Part of Plan to Discredit
‘Radicalizers’, HUFF. POST, Nov. 26, 2013,
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“radicalizers” known to be targeted by the NSA were Muslim
and all are believed to be currently residing outside the United
States though one has been described as a U.S. person.63
Snowden argued in a recent interview that this type of
surveillance and individual targeting may easily find its way
into U.S. politics, and these tactics could be used to spy on the
pornography-viewing habits of political opponents. 64
However, there is no evidence to suggest such a giant leap has
been made, and this type of slippery slope is exactly what
oversight committees, supervisors, and government lawyers,
need to monitor, and prevent any subsequent abuse of
power.65
The United States Intelligence Community including
the NSA collects foreign political, economic and military
intelligence in order to provide U.S. policy makers with the
necessary information to make the proper decisions in order to
protect our national security and promote America’s best
interests both at home and abroad. To accomplish this goal,
the IC, within certain legal limits needs to have access to every
conceivable intelligence collection technique. The moral and
ethical use of these tools, the potential benefits and possibility
for abuse, the advisability and public acceptance for these
techniques, are questions and discussions best left to the three
branches of our government, and the public, to a more limited
extent, to iron out.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-pornmuslims_n_4346128.html.
63 Id.
64 Bamford, supra note 54.
65 For example, it was reported that CIA officers searched the
computers of congressional staff while they prepared a Senate
Intelligence Committee report on the CIA’s detention and
interrogation program. The CIA’s inspector general investigated the
matter and sent a criminal referral to the DOJ for further
investigation. Mark Mazetti & Carl Hulse, Inquiry by C.I.A. Affirms It
Spied on Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/world/senate-intelligencecommitee-cia-interrogation-report.html?_r=0. This is exactly what
needs to be done when abuse of power is suspected.
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IV. THE DAMAGE DONE
Chairman of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies and former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey,
during a recent debate on whether Snowden was justified,
described four programs which have been compromised due
to the disclosures: (1) pre-Snowden, the IC had learned how to
counter Chinese cyber-attacks by sending their malware back
to the hackers after making some adjustments and creating
problems for them; Snowden’s disclosures explained how the
U.S. was able to do this; (2) pre-Snowden, the IC was able to
read emails and early stage drafts of emails of the Islamic State
of Iraq; Snowden’s disclosures allowed the terrorist group to
learn of this; (3) pre-Snowden, the Defense Department had
technology that allowed soldiers and CIA operatives to know
whether they were being followed; post-Snowden, this
technology has been shared with our adversaries; and (4) preSnowden, the U.S. learned how to penetrate the
communication networks in some Latin American countries of
some of the worst organizations and groups that are selling
women, principally women into sexual slavery; post-Snowden
those sex trafficking organizations now know which
communication networks are compromised.66
Any time a government employee or unauthorized
person reveals sources and methods used by law enforcement
or the IC, this disclosure allows criminals, spies, and terrorists
alike to minimize their risk of getting caught by taking
countermeasures. When FBI Director Comey reveals that “the
emergence of default encryption settings and encrypted
devices and networks” will “leave law enforcement in the
dark” and then names the specific companies building these
devices, the concern is that criminals will use these loopholes
to avoid detection.67 The protection of sources and methods is
critical to curtail illegal activity.
Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, supra note 43.
Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision
Course? A Conversation with FBI Director James Comey, BROOKINGS
INST., Oct. 16, 2014, transcript available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/16%20goin
g%20dark%20technology%20privacy%20comey%20fbi/20141016_fbi
_comey_transcript.pdf.
66
67
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Perhaps the exposure of specific programs, sources,
and methods is not the only problem, since there is now the
dilemma or revelation of what was not disclosed, what does
not exist, which indirectly underscores NSA limitations. In
other words, if all of NSA’s programs are disclosed,
theoretically everything that was not revealed does not exist.
NSA surveillance capabilities would be limited to the
techniques exposed by Snowden and others. Criminals and
terrorists alike have typically displayed signs of paranoia
believing that IC capabilities approach the levels of those
depicted in science fiction, and some adversaries are
concerned that their every move is being watched by law
enforcement.
And more than likely, our sophisticated
adversaries assume the government has greater surveillance
powers than they actually do. The mystique of “big brother”
can be a more effective weapon and deterrent than if our
adversaries actually knew our true capabilities. What these
disclosures have revealed is that the government has limits to
what they can target, who they can target, and what they can
access. As Snowden argues in his own words, “[t]he fact that
people know communications can be monitored does not stop
people from communicating [digitally]. Because the only
choices are to accept the risk, or to not communicate at all.”68
But at least now, our adversaries know which communication
service providers cooperate with the government, the specific
collection techniques being used, and where the IC has
focused the majority of its efforts. Our adversaries can now
develop
countermeasures,
alternative
methods
of
communicating with one another, and avoid or eliminate
operations with identified vulnerabilities. NSA’s mystique of
know-all, see-all has been seriously tarnished.
Extensive damage has been done to U.S. credibility and
trust issues with its foreign allies who no longer blindly trust
the United States with their intelligence secrets. Our allies
have reassessed the level of their cooperation on intelligence
Bamford, supra note 54. “And when we’re talking about things like
terrorist cells, nuclear proliferators – these are organised cells. These
are things an individual cannot do on their own. So if they abstain
from communicating, we’ve already won. If we’ve basically talked
the terrorists out of using our modern communications networks, we
have benefited in terms of security – we haven’t lost.” Id.
68
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sharing since the United States has been shown incapable of
keeping secrets and even occasionally spies on its closest
foreign partners. Foreign allies may be hesitant to cooperate
on the next terrorism investigation. Communications service
providers that were willing to cooperate with the government
previously on issues dealing with national security and efforts
to combat terrorism are now exposed, and may refuse to
cooperate with the government in the future without being
forced to do so by a court order.

V. CONCLUSION
It is not surprising Snowden revealed top secret
information on NSA surveillance programs twelve years after
9/11. When the PATRIOT Act, which provided the IC and law
enforcement with expansive surveillance and investigative
powers, passed in 2001, the law had strong popular support.
Americans feared for their safety. The government took
significant legal steps to ensure they would be better able to
attempt to predict and prevent another terrorist attack before
it occurred, and they have been, for the most part, extremely
successful in thwarting other 9/11-type attacks. Therefore, it is
ironic that the IC’s own success has paved the way for
whistleblowers such as Snowden to gain sufficient popularity
in order to reveal NSA programs under the guise of being
concerned about our right to privacy. The pendulum has
swung the other way, and Americans are more concerned
about potentially being monitored by the government than
they were immediately after 9/11. If the government had been
unsuccessful in preventing attacks, the concern would be
entirely different. The question would be what more can the
IC do to prevent such attacks from occurring rather than the
current question as to why the government is collecting so
much personal data. The risk of terrorist attacks seems to be, at
the very least, stabilized, and the bigger concern is our civil
liberties. Due to its success, the IC is now on the defensive (for
the opposite reason, i.e., intelligence failures identified post
9/11, the IC was encouraged to go on the offense). The
pendulum swings in both directions.
In short, all the media hype and “24/7 surveillance
state” diatribes should be taken with a grain of salt. The
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moniker “big, bad government” is a misnomer although our
system remains imperfect. Our leadership and government
employees are for the most part decent, honest, reliable folks
who are doing their jobs to the best of their ability. Some
government employees are abusing their power and should be
punished.
When discussing government surveillance
practices, there must be adequate oversight to avoid
widespread, abusive practices that gradually become so
pervasive that they are deemed acceptable: the habitual,
standard routine that becomes self-justifying and immune to
conscience and ethical scrutiny. However, full and specific
disclosure when it comes to the sensitive nature of intelligence
collection and its analysis is unnecessary. There are legal
remedies, anonymous tip lines, and multiple avenues to report
wrong doing when a whistleblower becomes concerned about
“perceived” illegal activity by the government. Snowden did
not pursue most of these legal remedies before disclosing
classified information to the media. It is true that certain
aspects of NSA’s bulk collection and interception efforts may
require further review and legal clarifications, but such
discussions need not take place on the front page of
newspapers.
The recent disclosures of NSA abuse as
“perceived” by Snowden do not come close to the pervasive
abuses described by the Church Committee in the seventies.
Despite Snowden’s pleas for an open-source
community free from monitoring, the Internet is not and will
not be free from surveillance regardless if the NSA participates
or not. It is naive to think otherwise. The government needs to
collect and analyze intelligence information in order to arrive
at the best domestic, foreign, economic, military, law
enforcement, or political decisions possible, and that includes
policy decisions on the fight against terrorism.
In one interview, Snowden makes reference to the
German Stasi that conducted “mass, indiscriminate spying
campaigns”69 in communist-dominated East Germany where
the secret police collected information on roughly one quarter
of the population.70 The NSA is not the Stasi of East Germany

Rusbridger & Macaskill, supra note 48.
Julia Angwin, You Know Who Else Collected Metadata? The Stasi.,
PROPUBLICA, Feb. 11, 2014,
69
70
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– the NSA is not conducting mass, indiscriminate spying
campaigns hoping to catch anti-government protestors in
incriminating positions in order to lock them away and
eliminate any and all dissent. Stasi-like dossiers are not being
created on individuals who vote a certain way or oppose
government policies. NSA does not monitor U.S. citizens to
identify their daily activities, what errands they run, what
websites they are viewing, and how their children are doing in
school. What NSA does do is collect positive intelligence
information, foreign intelligence information which is
collected and analysed under legal parameters.
These
collection efforts are meant to protect U.S. citizens from future
terrorist attacks and future cyber-attacks. Under section 702,
targeting and minimization procedures are in place, and FISA
warrants are required when the NSA wants to target U.S.
citizens suspected of being agents of a foreign power.
It is not the government surveillance programs we
should be overly concerned about. Public discussion and
congressional and internal oversight committees keep those
necessary but controversial programs under control and
within legal parameters. It is the few isolated cases of
individuals within the government who abuse their power
and betray the American people who are of major concern,
e.g., those who abuse their power and violate sections 215, 702
and FISA laws. Those are the illegalities that should be
brought to light, not our government’s specific sources,
methods, capabilities, and successes that our enemies
desperately want revealed.

http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-stasi-spied-on-socialnetworks.
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DAMMING THE LEAKS:
BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY,
WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Jason Zenor1
In the last few years we have had a number of infamous
national security leaks and prosecutions. Many have argued
that these people have done a great service for our nation by
revealing the wrongdoings of the defense agencies. However,
the law is quite clear- those national security employees who
leak classified information are subject to lengthy prison
sentences or in some cases, even execution as a traitor. In
response to the draconian national security laws, this article
proposes a new policy which fosters the free flow of
information. First, the article outlines the recent history of
national security leaks and the government response to the
perpetrators. Next, the article outlines the information policy
of the defense industry including the document classification
system, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
whistleblower laws and the Espionage Act. Finally, the article
outlines a new policy that will advance government
transparency by promoting whistleblowing that serves the
public interest, while balancing it with government efficiency
Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Media and the Arts,
State University of New York-Oswego.
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by encouraging proper channels of dissemination that actually
respond to exposures of government mismanagement.

“The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the
expense of informed representative
government provides no real security for our Republic.”
Justice Hugo Black2
“The oath of allegiance is not an oath of secrecy [but rather] an
oath to the Constitution.”
Edward Snowden3

I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s digital media landscape, it is becoming more
difficult to adequately balance the people’s need to access
information with the government’s need to operate with some
semblance of secrecy. U.S. legal precedent, such as The
Pentagon Papers4 and Bartnicki,5 makes it nearly impossible for
the government to punish or restrain journalists’ ability to
reveal lawfully obtained truthful information. Additionally,
the mainstreaming of “new media”6 has dissolved any clear
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring).
3 Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations,
Says His Mission's Accomplished, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-hismissions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html.
4 New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the Government did not show a
compelling interest to restrain the publication of contents of a topsecret study that analyzed the United States’ military involvement in
the Vietnam War).
5 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
6 In 2009, 44% of Americans were getting their news from online or
other mobile devices. 58% of Americans got their news from
television, 34% from radio, and 31% from newspapers. See generally
2
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definition of “journalist” and “journalism.”7 Thus, the
principles that the nation seeks to protect- transparency and
accountability, as well as public safety and efficient
government- are being challenged, as it is uncertain who is
working to inform the public and who is working to harm the
status quo.8
When the government acts illegally or there is gross
mismanagement, it is fairly easy to defend the need to expose
such transgressions. Traditional media outlets do expose
illegal government actions. For example, during the last
decade’s War on Terror, traditional media sources have
revealed CIA torture of enemy combatants,9 the existence of
Americans Spending More Time Following the News, PEW RES. CENTER,
Sept. 12, 2010, http://people-press.org/2010/09/12/americansspending-more-time-following-the-news/.
7 See Laura Durity, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”: The Need to Protect
Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium, DUKE L. & TECH. REV.,
Apr. 7, 2006, at 11 (arguing that attempts at federal shield law too
narrowly defined ‘journalist’ in the digital age).
8 New York Times Editor Bill Keller has called WikiLeaks “a
secretive cadre of anti-secrecy vigilantes.” Bill Keller, Dealing with
Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileakst.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1301544720v+nf9IYPS5RuUCMfTb6Aeg. More vitriolic is Conservative Pundit
and Tea Party Spokesperson, Glenn Beck, who has described
WikiLeaks as part of an international cabal determined to create a
new world order, stating:
What I'm talking to you about is what al Qaeda is
calling “operation hemorrhage” for their part. What
I have called the perfect storm, where like-minded
people, people who want to destroy the republic,
seize an opportunity. And the window for
opportunity for anarchy and chaos on this planet, to
overthrow our system here and the systems abroad
is now.
Glenn Beck, WikiLeaks Questions, FOX NEWS, Nov. 30, 2010,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2010/11/30/glenn-beckwikileaks-questions.html.
9 See, e.g., Exposing the Truth of Abu Ghraib (CBS television broadcast
Dec. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/exposing-the-truth-of-abughraib/.
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secret international prisons administered by the CIA referred
to as ‘black sites,’10 and the Bush Administration’s secret
wiretapping and NSA surveillance programs.11 But when it
comes to shining light on the actions of our national security
and defense agencies, it is not enterprising journalists who
‘discover’ secrets; it is employees within the agencies who
decide to inform the public of the actions which they believe to
be harmful to the nation.
The government did not want these transgressions
revealed to the public. But no criminal charges were brought
against the respective news outlets for these revelations12
because traditional media outlets exist in a legal framework
that protects journalists.13 However, the legal framework does

See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH.
POST, Nov. 2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html. Prior to
this Washington Post article, these sites were only known to “a
handful of officials in the United States and, usually, only to the
president and a few top intelligence officers in each host country.”
Id.
11 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spyon-callers-without-courts.html. The government argued that
publication of the story would alert the terrorists that they were
being watched. Id.
12 To have done so would certainly have been politically unpopular,
but it is possible that criminal charges would have held up in court.
“Undoubtedly Congress has the power to enact specific and
appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and
preserve government secrets.” New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730
(Stewart, J., concurring); see also Walter Pincus, Prosecution of
Journalists Is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100348.html.
13 Journalists are protected by an exception under the Espionage Act
and by case law such as The Pentagon Papers and Bartnicki. However,
they are not constitutionally protected from being compelled to
divulge their sources in federal court. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972). Cf. Jason Zenor, Shielding Acts of Journalism: Open
Leak Sites, National Security and the Free Flow of Information, 39 NOVA
L. REV. 365 (2015) (arguing for a statutory protection of journalists
10

65

3 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015)

not protect the sources of this information, thus the
government zealously pursues the leakers.14
In 2013, Edward Snowden gained infamy after he fled
the country and leaked classified information pertaining to an
NSA surveillance program.15 Some argue that Snowden is a
patriot and hero.16 He opened our eyes- though it was widely
suspected, most Americans did not realize the span of
government surveillance that was happening and what was
allowed by the PATRIOT Act.17 The leaks also revealed illegal
surveillance of foreign leaders.18 He exposed the actions of the
government which are not supported by the Constitution.
Yet, others argue that Snowden’s leaks have severely
harmed the U.S. government’s interests.19 They made the
government’s enemies, specifically terrorist groups, aware of
how the U.S. intelligence entities operate. They have soured
relationships between U.S. and foreign governments,
especially those in which it was revealed that the U.S. had
spied on them. Furthermore, foreign governments and private
companies working with the U.S. government may be hesitant
to share information for fear it will be exposed. Ultimately, the
government is fearful that every secret is now fair game and a
government cannot function in this way.
who disseminate leaked national security information that serves the
public interest).
14 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012).
15 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining
Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligencemining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secretprogram/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html.
16 See, e.g., Douglas Rushkoff, Edward Snowden is a Hero, CNN, June
10, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/rushkoffsnowden-hero/index.html.
17 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 11.
18 See generally, Snowden NSA: Germany to Investigate Merkel Phone
Tap, BBC NEWS, June 4, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-27695634.
19 See, e.g., Michael Hayden, Ex-CIA Chief: What Edward Snowden Did,
CNN, July 19, 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/opinion/hayden-snowdenimpact/index.html.
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This article attempts to resolve the unease caused by
national security leaks by proposing a new policy on the free
flow of information in the 21st Century. This proposal
attempts to balance government transparency with
government efficiency. This new policy will advance
transparency by promoting ‘whistleblowing’ on national
security misconduct. It will promote government efficiency by
encouraging proper channels of dissemination while
guaranteeing protections that current laws do not. Part II of
the article outlines the recent history of national security leaks
and the government response to the perpetrators. Part III of
the article outlines the information policy of the defense
industry including the document classification system, FOIA,
whistleblower law and the Espionage Act. Finally, Part IV of
the article proposes the new policy that will advance
government transparency by promoting whistleblowing that
serves the public interest, while balancing it with government
efficiency by encouraging proper channels of dissemination
and responsive government.

II. THE WHISTLEBLOWERS
A. BRADLEY MANNING
Bradley Manning was an intelligence analyst who
reviewed classified material during the Iraq War.20 In 2010,
Manning copied much of the classified material that she
encountered and leaked it to WikiLeaks, an open leaks site
that uses encrypted software to protect anonymity of those
who leak classified information.21 WikiLeaks published
thousands of documents including the “Afghan War Diary,”22
Profile: Private First Class Manning, BBC NEWS, Apr. 23, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11874276.
21 Paul Courson & Matt Smith, WikiLeaks Source Manning Gets 35
Years, Will Seek Pardon, CNN, Aug. 22, 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/21/us/bradley-manningsentencing/.
22 This consisted of over 750,000 pages of never-before-released
documents relating to the war in Afghanistan. See Alastair Dant &
David Leigh, Afghanistan War Logs: Our Selection of Significant
Incidents, THE GUARDIAN, July 25, 2010,
20
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“The Iraq War Logs,”23 and State Department documents
known as “Cablegate.”24 They also released a video titled
“Collateral Murder” which showed gun-sight footage of a
2007 airstrike in Baghdad that killed a Reuters reporter and
innocent civilians including children.25
Manning had confided in a friend, Adrian Lamo, that
she had leaked the information.26 Lamo then notified the U.S.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/interactive/2010/jul
/25/afghanistan-war-logs-events.
23 This consisted of almost 400,000 documents relating to the war in
Iraq. See Iraq: The War Logs, THE GUARDIAN,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq-war-logs.
24 Julian Barnes, What Bradley Manning Leaked, WALL STREET J., Aug.
21, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/21/whatbradley-manning-leaked/.
25 Full footage of Collateral Murder is available at: Collateral Murder –
Wikileaks – Iraq, YOUTUBE.COM,
http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=http%3A//www.y
outube.com/watch%3Fv%3D5rXPrfnU3G0. Julian Assange,
WikiLeaks founder, commented on the naming of the video: “[w]e
want to knock out this 'collateral damage' euphemism, and so when
anyone uses it they will think, ‘collateral murder.’” Greg Mitchell,
One Year Ago: How the ‘Era of WikiLeaks’ Began—With ‘Murder’, HUFF.
POST, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregmitchell/one-year-ago-how-the-era_b_841376.html). The soldiers’
reactions are documented on the film: “[l]ook at those dead
bastards,” one pilot says. “Nice,” the other responds. A wounded
man can be seen crawling and the pilots impatiently hope that he
will try to fire at them so that, under the rules of engagement, they
can shoot him again. “All you gotta do is pick up a weapon,” one
pilot says. A short time later a van arrives to pick up the wounded
and the pilots open fire on it, wounding two children inside. “Well,
it’s their fault for bringing their kids into a battle,” one pilot says. At
another point, an American armored vehicle arrives and appears to
roll over one of the dead. “I think they just drove over a body,” one
of the pilots says, chuckling a little. The U.S. media had initially
covered the incident, but little time was spent on it. See, e.g., Alissa
Rubin, 2 Iraqi Journalists Killed as U.S. Forces Clash with Militias, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.h
tml.
26 Ed Pilkington, Adrian Lamo Tells Manning Trial About Six Days of
Chats with Accused Leaker, THE GUARDIAN, June 4, 2013,
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Army of Mannings’ actions.27 Just weeks after the video was
posted, the military arrested Manning and she was charged
with twenty-two offenses including violations of the
Espionage Act and “aiding the enemy.”28 In February 2013,
Manning pled guilty to ten counts and was tried for the
remaining charges.29 In July 2013, Bradley Manning was
convicted on seventeen counts and sentenced to thirty-five
years in prison.30 She is serving her sentence in maximum
security at the Army’s Fort Leavenworth prison in Kansas.31

B. EDWARD SNOWDEN
Edward Snowden worked for the CIA from 2006Starting in 2009, Snowden worked as a private national
security contractor with the NSA’s surveillance programs.33 In
2013, he left his contracting job and flew to Hong Kong with a
plan to leak classified information about the NSA’s
surveillance programs to the press.34
2009.32

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/adrian-lamotestifies-bradley-manning.
27 Id.
28 Conviction of “aiding the enemy” could have resulted in
execution. Jim Miklaszewski & Courtney Kube, Manning Faces New
Charges, Possible Death Penalty, NBC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2011,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41876046/ns/us_newssecurity/t/manning-faces-new-charges-possible-deathpenalty/#.VNhBGXIo600.
29 Profile: Private First Class Manning, supra note 20.
30 Manning was acquitted of aiding the enemy which may have been
punishable by execution. He has the possibility of parole after
another eight years. Courson & Smith, supra note 21.
31 John Hanna, Bradley Manning Prison Term Will Be Served at Fort
Leavenworth, HUFF. POST, Aug. 21, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/21/bradley-manningprison_n_3792135.html.
32 John Broder & Scott Shane, For Snowden, A Life of Ambition, Despite
the Drifting, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/us/for-snowden-a-life-ofambition-despite-the-drifting.html?pagewanted=all.
33 Id.
34 Id. Snowden claimed that he had made several complaints to his
superiors about the legality of the surveillance program, but was
told to remain quiet. The U.S. government claims that there is no
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The Guardian published Snowden’s claims that the
NSA, with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s
approval,
was
collecting
telephone
records
both
internationally and domestically.35 The Guardian released
specific information on the NSA’s methodologies, the
operation of classified intelligence courts, and the U.S.
government’s relationship with foreign governments.36 The
information implicated the wrongdoing of both the U.S. and
U.K. governments.37
Shortly after the publications, Snowden publically
identified himself as the source of the leak.38 The U.S.
government charged Snowden with violating the Espionage
Act by stealing and disclosing state secrets.39 Snowden spent
several weeks as a fugitive while he waited for asylum.40
Finally, Russia granted asylum to Snowden in August of 2013,
where he remains.41
evidence that Snowden ever made complaints. See Charlie Savage,
Snowden Says He Reported N.S.A. Surveillance Concerns Before Leaks,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/world/europe/snowdensays-he-reported-nsa-surveillance-concerns-before-leaks.html.
35 See generally, Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded,
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/sn
owden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg Miller, Edward Snowden
Comes Forward as Source of NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, June 9, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaderspush-back-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e826d299ff459_story.html.
39 This crime carries a punishment of not more than ten years in
prison. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2012).
40 Andre de Nesnera, Snowden May Face Tough Time in Russian
Asylum, VOICE OF AMERICA (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://www.voanews.com/content/snowden-may-face-rocky-roadin-russia/1734858.html.
41 Id. The initial grant was for one year, but Russia then granted
Snowden a three year residency. Michael Birnbaum, Russia Grants
Edward Snowden Residency for Three More Years, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russiagrants-edward-snowden-residency-for-3-more-
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C. THOMAS DRAKE
Thomas Drake was an intelligence analyst who went to
work for the NSA in 2001.42 He held several jobs with the
NSA, including working in the Signals Intelligence
Directorate, Cryptologic Systems and Professional Health
Office and in the Directorate of Engineering.43 Drake worked
on developing intelligence collection through digital
networks.44 At that time there were two main tools that the
NSA was deciding between: the Trailblazer Project and the
ThinThread Project.45 Drake favored the ThinThread project
because he felt it protected the privacy of U.S. citizens and was
a fraction of the cost.46 However, the NSA decided to move
forward with the Trailblazer Project.47
Drake felt that the NSA’s actions were mismanagement
and waste.48 In 2002, he decided to report it through the
proper channels, including his superiors, the NSA Inspector
General, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense,
and the Congressional Intelligence Committees of both houses
of Congress.49 In 2004, the NSA Inspector General found that
Drake’s concerns were legitimate and the Trailblazer project

years/2014/08/07/8b257293-1c30-45fd-84648ed278d5341f_story.html.
42 His first day was September 11th, 2001. Jane Mayer, The Secret
Sharer, THE NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/23/the-secretsharer.
43 Frederick Reese, Sacrifices in Journalism and Whistleblowing: A
Tribute to Truth-Tellers, MINT PRESS, Jan. 30, 2015,
http://www.mintpressnews.com/sacrifices-in-journalism-andwhistleblowing-a-tribute-to-truth-tellers/200119/.
44 Id.
45 Mayer, supra note 42.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Ellen Nakashima, Former NSA Executive Thomas A. Drake May Pay
High Price for Media Leak, WASH. POST, July 14, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071305992.html.
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was wasteful at a price-tag of over $1 billion.50 The
Department of Defense echoed those concerns in its
subsequent reports.51
In 2006, Drake told Baltimore Sun reporter Siobhan
Gorman about the waste happening at the NSA, including the
Trailblazer program.52 In 2007, the FBI raided Drake’s home
and found classified material in his possession.53 In 2010, a
grand jury in Baltimore, Maryland indicted Drake pursuant to
the Espionage Act for willfully releasing national defense
information,54 as well as obstructing justice and making false
statements to a federal officer.55
Drake was not charged with disclosing classified
information.56 Nonetheless, he faced a possible thirty-five
years in prison.57 The U.S. government claimed that the
prosecution was not in retaliation to Drake’s reporting of NSA
waste, rather the prosecution stood on the merits of the case.58
R. Jeffrey Smith, Classified Pentagon Report Upholds Thomas Drake’s
Complaints About NSA, WASH. POST, June 22, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/nationalsecurity/classified-pentagon-report-upholds-thomas-drakescomplaints-about-nsa/2011/06/22/AG1VHTgH_story.html.
51 Id.
52 Siobhan Gorman, Second-Ranking NSA Official Forced Out of Job by
Director, BALTIMORE SUN, May 31, 2006,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-0531/news/0605310010_1_alexander-black-spy-agency.
53 Gabrielle Levy, Exclusive Interview: NSA Whistleblower on What He’d
Do Differently Now, UPI, May 7, 2014,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2014/05/07/ExclusiveInterview-NSA-whistleblower-on-what-hed-do-differentlynow/1511399476082/.
54 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2012).
55 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012).
56 Bio: Thomas Drake, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT,
http://www.whistleblower.org/bio-thomas-drake (last visited Jan.
28, 2014).
57 David Wise, Leaks and the Law: The Story of Thomas Drake,
SMITHSONIAN MAG., Aug. 2011,
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/leaks-and-the-law-thestory-of-thomas-drake-14796786/.
58 Scott Shane, Obama Takes a Hard Line Against Leaks to Press, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/us/politics/12leak.html.
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Drake eventually struck a deal with the prosecution and pled
guilty to a misdemeanor for misusing NSA’s computer
system.59 He was sentenced to one year probation and
community service.60

D. STEPHEN JIN-WOO KIM
Stephen Jin-Woo Kim was a private contractor that
worked as a Senior Advisor in the State Department’s Bureau
of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.61 His job
was to analyze North Korea’s nuclear program.62 In 2009, Kim
told FOX News journalist James Rosen that North Korea was
planning to test a nuclear bomb.63 In 2010, a grand jury
indicted Kim pursuant to the Espionage Act for unauthorized
disclosure of defense information,64 as well as making false
statements.65 The information that Kim disclosed was not
classified, but the information was in relation to ‘national
defense.’66 Kim pled guilty to disclosing national defense
information and was sentenced to thirteen months in prison.67

Wise, supra note 57.
Id.
61 Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 2, United
States v. Jin-Woo Kim, 2013 WL 3866545 (D.D.C. July 24, 2013),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/jud/kim/032414-sent.pdf.
62 Id.
63 Conor Friedersdorf, Did James Rosen’s Story on North Korea Do Any
Harm?, THE ATLANTIC, May 23, 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/did-jamesrosens-story-on-north-korea-do-any-harm/276152/.
64 18 U.S.C. § 793(d).
65 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
66 Mark Hosenball, Justice Department Indicts Contractor in Alleged
Leak, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/justice-department-indicts-contractoralleged-leak-217186.
67 Josh Gerstein, Contractor Pleads Guilty in Leak Case, POLITICO, Feb. 7,
2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/stephen-kim-jamesrisen-state-department-fox-news-103265.
59
60
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E. JEFFREY STERLING
Sterling began working as an officer for the CIA in
1993.68 In 2000, Sterling filed a complaint with the CIA’s Equal
Employment Office alleging racial discrimination.69 In 2001,
Sterling was placed on administrative leave, and his classified
information privileges were revoked.70 In 2002, the CIA
terminated him.71 Sterling’s subsequent lawsuit against the
CIA was dismissed because the trial would have disclosed
classified information.72 In 2005, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the case’s dismissal.73
In 2010, the U.S. government indicted Sterling for
violating the Espionage Act with his unauthorized disclosure
of the national defense information.74 The government
discovered emails and telephone communication between
Sterling and The New York Times reporter, James Risen.75 The
U.S. government claimed that Sterling detailed the CIA’s
secret plot to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program by giving the

Matt Apuzzo, C.I.A. Officer is Found Guilty in Leak Tied to Times
Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/us/politics/cia-officer-inleak-case-jeffrey-sterling-is-convicted-of-espionage.html?_r=0.
69 Id.
70 Former CIA Officer Convicted of Violating Espionage Act, SKY VALLEY
NEWS, Jan. 28, 2015,
http://www.skyvalleychronicle.com/FEATURE-NEWS/FORMERCIA-OFFICER-CONVICTED-OF-VIOLATING-ESPIONAGE-ACTbr-i-And-here-s-the-back-story-much-of-the-news-media-did-notreport-i-2002227.
71 Id.
72 Josh Gerstein, Ex-CIA Officer Found Guilty in Leak Trial, POLITICO,
Jan. 26, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/jeffreysterling-convicted-cia-leak-trial-114605.html.
73 See Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Warren
Richey, Former Covert CIA Agent Charged with Leaking Secrets to
Newspaper, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 6, 2011,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0106/Formercovert-CIA-agent-charged-with-leaking-secrets-to-newspaper.
74 The indictment also charged mail fraud and obstruction of justice.
Apuzzo, supra note 68.
75 Id.
68
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foreign government misinformation.76 Risen wrote about the
mission in his book and painted it as a mismanaged and
potentially dangerous campaign that may have aided Iran’s
nuclear program.77
Sterling pled not guilty to all counts.78 There was no
direct proof that Sterling had given this information to Risen.79
In fact, Sterling had gone to the U.S. Senate in 2003 to report
the program.80 His attorneys argued that Risen could have
pieced together the information from leaks on Capitol Hill.81
Despite the lack of solid evidence, in January 2015, Sterling
was convicted. In May 2015 he was sentenced to forty-two
months, much less than had been anticipated.82

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION
The paramount concern of the First Amendment is to
protect the free flow of information to the people concerning
issues of public interest.83 As Justice’s Black and Douglas
explained in concurring opinions in The Pentagon Papers,

Id.
See generally, JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF
THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006).
78 See Apuzzo, supra note 68.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Sterling claimed that he only discussed his discrimination suit
against the CIA with Risen. Id.
82 Matt Apuzzo, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Sentenced in Leak Case Tied to Times
Reporter, May 11, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/us/ex-cia-officer-sentencedin-leak-case-tied-to-times-reporter.html.
83 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 (1964). As Justice
Breyer argued in Garcetti: “Government administration typically
involves matters of public concern. Why else would government be
involved? And ‘public issues,’ indeed, matters of ‘unusual
importance,’ are often daily bread-and-butter concerns for the police,
the intelligence agencies, the military, and many whose jobs involve
protecting the public's health, safety, and the environment.” Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 448 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76
77
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“[s]ecrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic.”84
When our government shrouds itself in secrecy, it “provides
no real security for our Republic.”85 Accordingly, it is “only a
free and unrestrained press [that] can effectively expose
deception in government,”86 but, “[a] free press cannot be
made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to
supply it with information.”87 Instead, it is government
employees speaking out against their employers who are often
in the best position to expose deception in government.88
Consequently, public debate has much to gain when
government employees speak.89

B. ACCESS TO INFORMATION
1. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was
passed in 1966.90 Prior to FOIA, the only two public
information laws were the Administrative Procedures Act of

84

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
86 Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
87 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g, 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) (holding that
newspapers could not be punished for publishing the name of a
juvenile rape victim discovered from listening to police radio
signals).
88 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that
government employee speech could not be abridged unless the
government could show that the employee was not speaking on a
matter of public concern and it disrupted government
administration).
89 Id.
90 See Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the
Open Government Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
427 (2008) (detailing the history of FOIA); see also Martin Halstuk,
The Freedom of Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of
Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in What the Government’s up
to, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511 (2006) (detailing the evolution of privacy
exemptions in FOIA).
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194691 and the Housekeeping Statute of 1789.92 Both Acts gave
the executive branch unlimited discretion as to what
information it could keep secret.93 FOIA, on the other hand,
amended the APA to add a presumption of openness for all
federal documents.94 But FOIA did provide nine exemptions,
including one for national security.95 Other exemptions
included trade secrets,96 personal privacy rights,97 internal
practices,98 and ongoing law enforcement proceedings.99 FOIA
has eliminated much of the government’s preference for
secrecy in order to protect political embarrassment and
concordantly, courts have construed the exemptions
narrowly.100
In 1974, after Watergate, Congress amended the FOIA
because of perceived abuse with the national security
Administrative Procedure Act § 3, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237,
238 (1946).
92 Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 301 (2006)).
93 See Halstuk, supra note 90.
94 See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152
(1989).
95 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“This section does not apply to
matters that are specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy[.]”).
96 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) (“This section does not apply to matters that are
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged or confidential[.]”).
97 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (“This section does not apply to matters that
are personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy[.]”); See also S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 38 (1965) (“At the same
time that a broad philosophy of ‘freedom of information’ is enacted
into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of
privacy . . . such as medical and personnel files.”).
98 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), (5); See also S. Rep. No 89-813, at 44 (1965)
(Exception 5 recognized that the “[g]overnment would be greatly
hampered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all
Government agencies were prematurely forced to ‘operate in a
fishbowl.’”).
99 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
100 See, e.g., Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)
(granting FOIA request for Air Force Academy Honor Code).
91
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exemption.101 Congress also amended the law enforcement
exemption to require that the government show the requested
record was compiled for law enforcement and that publication
would result in an enumerated harm.102 But, in 1986, the
national security and law enforcement exemption were
expanded to include terrorism.103 It also exempted matters that
are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive Order.”104 Furthermore, in FOIA
cases dealing with national security exemptions, courts
continue to give great deference to the executive branch
defining what constitutes potential harms from releasing
documents.105

2. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
At the federal level, documents can be classified as
“top secret,” “secret,” or “confidential.”106 The last two
overhauls of the government document classification system
came in 1995107 and 2003,108 during the Clinton and Bush

See Halstuk, supra note 90.
Id.
103 See James Goldston, Jennifer Granholm & Robert Robinson, A
Nation Less Secured: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV 409 (1986) (reviewing 1986 amendments to FOIA).
104 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
105 It is “well-established that the judiciary owes some measure of
deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a
uniquely executive purview.” Ctr. for Nat’l Security Studies v. Dep’t
of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (denying FOIA
request for name of detainees). Cf. Nathan Slegers, De Novo Review
Under The Freedom of Information Act: The Case Against Judicial
Deference to Agency Decisions to Withhold Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 209 (2006).
106 See David McGinty, The Statutory and Executive Development of the
National Security Exemption to Disclosure Under the Freedom of
Information Act: Past and Present, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 67 (2005).
107 Classified National Security Information (Clinton Order), Exec. Order
No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,843 (Apr. 17, 1995). Prior to FDR
Administration establishing a classification system, each agency had
101
102

DAMMING THE LEAKS

78

Administrations respectively. Under the Clinton Order, a
document must have an articulable impact on national
security in order to be classified.109 National security was
defined as “national defense or foreign relations of the United
States.”110 The Clinton Order established the Interagency
Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) that reviews
employee and public (non-FOIA) challenges to the
classification of documents.111 The President appoints the
members of ISCAP and is made of senior level members of the
Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of
Justice, and National Archives.112
In 2003, the Bush Order amended the 1995 order.113
First, it removed a clause that stated information “shall not be
classified” whenever there “is significant doubt about the need
full discretion to classify documents without requiring justification.
See Exec. Order No. 8381. 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Mar. 22, 1940).
108 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003)
reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006).
109 Prior to the Clinton Order, there was a category that protected
“confidential sources” and an ambiguous “catchall category.” See
McGinty, supra note 106.
110 In order to be labeled confidential, there has to be identifiable
damage if the document were to be released. Information that can be
classified includes:
“military plans, weapons systems, or operations”;
“foreign government information”; “intelligence
activities (including special activities), intelligence
sources or methods, or cryptology”; “scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to the
national security, which includes defense against
transnational
terrorism”;
“United
States
Government programs for safeguarding nuclear
materials
or
facilities”;
“vulnerabilities
or
capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures,
projects, plans, or protection services relating to the
national security, which includes defense against
transnational terrorism”; or “weapons of mass
destruction.”
Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
111 See Classified National Security Information (Clinton Order), supra
note 107.
112 Id.
113 Exec. Order No. 13,292, supra note 108.
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to classify” it.114 The Bush Order also omitted a requirement to
classify information at the lower of two possible classification
levels when there is uncertainty as to which level is
appropriate.115 The Bush Order also added that “[t]he
unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is
presumed to cause damage to the national security.”116 Finally,
the 2003 order allows for the reclassification of previously
declassified, public documents. 117
In 2009, the Obama Administration executed its own
order to amend the classification system. The new system has
a presumption against classification.118 Also, employees are
expected to voice objections to the ISCAP when they disagree
with classifications in good faith.119 But, agencies have
discretion to classify any information that may hurt national
security−though this is not defined.120 National Security
agency heads can also delay the ISCAP declassification of
documents by seeking an appeal to the President.121
Id.
Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. See Jane Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of
Terror: The Bush Administration’s Assault on the Freedom of Information,
11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 479 (2006) (reviewing how the Bush
Administration’s changes to classification systems affected free flow
of information).
118 Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.1(b), 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
119 Id. at § 1.8.
120 Id. at § 1.2. Cf. Reducing Over-Classification Act, H.R. 553, 111th
Cong. (2010). The purpose of the act is to “prevent federal
departments and agencies from unnecessarily classifying
information or classifying information at a higher and more
restricted level than is warranted, and by doing so to promote
information sharing across departments and agencies and with State,
local, tribal and private sector counterparts, as appropriate.” Id. For a
discussion on the classification system in the United States, see
Wendy Keefer, Protection of Information to Preserve National Security: Is
WikiLeaks Really the Issue?, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 457 (2011).
121 Id. at § 3. Between 1996-2008, ISCAP voted to declassify (whole or
in-part) 495 of 796 documents (64%). Steven Aftergood, Reducing
Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399,
407 (2009). Despite the ISCAP’s acceptance of transparency, there is
plenty of evidence that executive agencies have become more secret
after 9/11, often invoking the mosaic theory that even documents
114
115
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C. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS AND PUNISHMENTS
1. FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS
Federal employees are protected by a patchwork of
whistleblower
protections.122
These
laws
include
123
Whistleblower Act of 1989,
which protects civilian
employees from wrongful dismissal, and the No FEAR Act,124
which makes agencies directly and financially responsible for
illegal retaliation. The Department of Labor houses the Office
of the Whistleblower Protection Program that “administers the
whistleblower protection provisions of more than twenty
whistleblower protection statutes” for civilian employees.125
Members of the U.S. military are protected by the Military

that, on their own, do not concern national security are connected
somehow to national security interests, thus, must be classified. See,
e.g., David Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the
Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L. J. 628 (2005).
122 See Sarah Wood Borak, The Legacy of “Deep Throat”: The Disclosure
Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the
No FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617 (2005) (documenting
the history of federal whistleblower statutes). Congress passed the
first Whistleblower statutes in 1778. The law protected soldiers who
reported inhumane treatment of POWs. Stephen M. Kohn, The
Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/opinion/13kohn.html.
123 Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as amended 5
U.S.C. § 2302 (2012)).
124 Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and
Retaliation Act of 2002 (No FEAR Act), Pub. L. No. 107-74, § 104, 116
Stat. 566 (2002).
125 Federal employees can “report violations of workplace safety and
health, airline, commercial motor carrier, consumer product,
environmental, financial reform, food safety, health insurance
reform, motor vehicle safety, nuclear, pipeline, public transportation
agency, railroad, maritime, and securities laws.” The employees are
protected from retaliation in the form of “blacklisting, demoting,
denying overtime or promotion, disciplining, denial of benefits,
failure to hire or rehire, intimidation, making threats, reassignment
affecting prospects for promotion, or reducing pay or hours[.]”
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS,
www.whistleblowers.gov (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
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Whistleblower Protection Act.126 This Act protects the military
members’ ability to report a violation of the law to members of
Congress, Inspector Generals, chains of command, or other
law enforcement.127
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garcetti v.
Ceballos.128 The case limited the free speech rights of
government employees by not protecting speech that was
conducted within the official job duties.129 The U.S. House of
Representatives responded by proposing a bill titled the
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007.130 The bill
would have expanded the protections afforded to federal
employees who disclosed government waste, fraud and
abuse.131 The Act also granted access to jury trials132 for
government employees who had been retaliated against. The
See 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2012).
Military members can report “sexual harassment, unlawful
discrimination, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial or specific danger to public
health or safety.” UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, THE MILITARY
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT,
http://www.uscg.mil/legal/MilitaryWhistlerBlowerProtectionAct.a
sp (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
128 547 U.S. 410 (2006). With the nebulous nature of job descriptions
and the perpetuity of the workday due to advances in technology, it
is arguable that a public employee is always working and can never
speak without representing his or her employer. See generally Robert
Drechsel, The Declining First Amendment Rights of Government News
Sources: How Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of Newsworthy
Information, 16 COMM. L & POL’Y 129 (2011) (arguing that the Garcetti
prong has greatly curtailed public employee speech and the free
flow of information).
129 547 U.S. at 423.
130 H.R. 985, 110th Cong. (2007).
131 Id.
132 Over the last seventeen years of whistleblower cases, the federal
courts have sided with the government 210 times while siding with
whistleblowers only three times. See Anniston Star Editorial Board,
Holding up Progress, Senate’s Shameful Little Secret, ANNISTON STAR,
Mar. 14, 2011,
http://annistonstar.uber.matchbin.net/pages/full_story/push?artic
le-Holding+up+progress-+Senates+shameful+little+secret%20&id=12326421.
126
127
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House passed the bill by a margin of 331-94.133 The Senate then
passed its own whistleblower bill.134 But, it contained fewer
protections with no access to jury trials.135 As a result, the two
houses were unable to negotiate a compromise and the bill
failed.136
In 2009, the Senate proposed another Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act. This bill would have provided
for jury trials for federal employees and even protected
employees in national security positions.137 However, in 2010
after WikiLeaks revealed hundreds of leaked documents,
Congress began to strip much of the legislation’s protections,
including those for national security workers.138 Finally, in
2012 the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act was
finally passed.139
Whistleblower law provides little protection for those
who leak national security information. Congress recognized
this and passed the Intelligence Community Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1998.140 This Act protected all employees
and contractors of national security agencies who disclosed
maters of “urgent concern” such as violation of the law, false
statement to Congress, or retaliation against protected
whistleblowers.141 However, whistleblowers could not make
Id.
Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act, S. 274, 110th
Cong. (2007).
135 Id.
136 See Holding up Progress, Senate’s Shameful Little Secret, supra note
132.
137 The Senate added the national security clause after two
Department of Homeland Security officials lost their jobs after
alleging agency abuses. See Alan Maimon, WikiLeaks Furor Causes
Defeat of Rights Bill with Las Vegas Ties, LAS VEGAS J. REV., Mar. 30,
2011, http://www.lvrj.com/news/-wikileaks-furor-causes-defeatof-rights-bill-with-lv-ties-114920289.html.
138 See Project on Government Oversight, How a Red Herring About
WikiLeaks Killed Whistleblower Protections, HUFF. POST, Jan. 7, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/project-on-governmentoversight/how-a-red-herring-about-w_b_805915.html.
139 Pub.L. No. 112–199, § 108(a), 126 Stat. 1468 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)).
140 Pub.L. No. 105–272, Title VII, 112 Stat. 2396 (1998) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 2302).
141 50 U.S.C. § 3024 (2013).
133
134
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disclosures directly to Congress. They had to make disclosures
to the respective agency’s Inspector General who then must
inform the agency head.142 Furthermore, the Inspector
General’s decisions are not subject to judicial review.143
Finally, agencies are open to remove security clearance, as
courts have held that this is not a form of retaliation that is
subject to review.144
In 2012, the Obama Administration published
Presidential Policy Directive 19.145 The directive extends some
whistleblower protection to national security employees. Such
employees cannot suffer retaliation for good faith reports of
waste or fraud to his or her superiors, Inspector Generals or
the Director of National Intelligence.146 Employees can appeal
decisions of their superiors to a three-person panel made up of
Inspector Generals, but the panel’s decision is subject to
review by the agency head.147 Also, there is no right to an
external review by a court.148 Ultimately, such a directive does
not have the force of law and requires the agencies to adopt it.
Future Presidents can change the policy.

2. ESPIONAGE ACT
The Espionage Act149 bars the disclosure of information
regarding national defense. Sections 793(a)-(b) deal with
disclosures to foreign governments, which can be punished
with life in prison or death.150 Most of the recent national
security leaks have been prosecuted pursuant to Section
793(d). This section bars the willful transmission of any
The whistleblower can inform Congressional Intelligence
Committees under certain conditions. Id.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., Gargiulo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1185
(Fed. Cir. 2013); Robinson v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 498 F.3d 1361,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
145 Presidential Policy Directive-19, Protecting Whistleblowers with
Access to Classified Information (Oct. 10, 2012), available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-19.pdf.
146 Contractors are not included in the directive. Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2006).
150 Id.
142
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national security document to persons “not entitled to receive
it.”151 This section of the Espionage Act does not require
actual harms, nor does it require that the information had been
leaked to an enemy. Additionally, the leaker’s belief in the
value the information has to the public is also irrelevant. Each
violation of this section can be punished with up to ten years
in prison.152

IV. A POLICY PROPOSAL TO PROTECT THE FREE FLOW OF
INFORMATION: PROVIDING JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR
WHISTLEBLOWERS IN NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS
In order to promote whistleblowing, there must be a
confidential channel and strong statutory protections for
potential whistleblowers.153 Without such channels and
protections, potential whistleblowers will turn to the
traditional press, or more disconcerting, open leak
platforms.154 The result will be unadulterated document
dumping on transparency sites as we saw with Bradley
Manning and WikiLeaks. Thus, Congress should amend the
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act to
promote internal communication.
The amendments should create an external
independent tribunal to review the classification of
documents, specifically when a government employee or

Id.
Id.
153 Exec. Order 13,526 calls for federal employees to report misgiving
about document classification and the ISCAP is available to review
the complaints without fear of retribution to the employee. See Exec.
Order No. 13,526, supra note 118. But, the ISCAP is made up of
senior officials of national security agencies. This does not promote
check and balances in government, nor would it be comforting to the
employee. See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Our Untransparent President, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/opinion/27stone.html?hp
(arguing that the Obama Administration has not backed
whistleblower protection, has prosecuted more employees for leaks,
and commonly claimed states secrets privilege).
154 See supra Part II.
151
152
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contractor is considering leaking a document.155 Potential
whistleblowers can file a complaint with the independent
tribunal and seek review of the classification.156 Similar to
traditional FOIA cases, the tribunal would conduct in-camera
reviews of the national security ‘secrets’ to determine if the
document was properly classified.157 Furthermore, the
complaint, the complainant and the judicial review will all be
confidential.158 This will protect the whistleblower and
promote legal channels.159 It will also protect the government
and the confidentiality of documents that are found to be
properly classified.

1. THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD FOR DECLASSIFYING
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
In reviewing the classified documents, the independent
tribunal should apply the following five-part test. In order to
be properly classified, the government must show that the
documents:
160

1) contain information pertinent to national security;
and
2) do not contain information about illegal government
actions.161
For another description of an independent tribunal reviewing
government document classification, see Doug Meier, Changing with
the Times: How the Government Must Adapt to Prevent the Publication of
its Secrets, 28 REV. LITIG. 203 (2008). Editor’s Note: Mr. Meier takes a
viewpoint much different than this author. Mr. Meier argues for
enhancing the government’s ability to withhold information and
prosecute all leakers.
156 Id.
157 For example, in the FOIA request for the torture pictures from
Abu Ghraib, the court conducted an in camera review of the
redacted reports and photos and decided that the interest in open
government outweighs the privacy claims. See Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). It
cannot be classified only to cover-up embarrassing information. Id.
158 See infra Part IV.A.2.
159 Cf. Presidential Policy Directive 19, supra note 145.
160 See supra Part III.C.2.
161 Id.
155
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Any documents that do not survive that test will automatically
be declassified.162 If the classification survives the first two
prongs, then the government can show by clear and convincing
evidence that the information is either:
1) not in the public interest;163 or 2) it will cause “direct,
immediate and irreparable harm.”164 Then the information will
remained classified. Finally, the court must apply a balancing
test to determine whether the benefits of declassification
outweigh the benefits to the public interest.165
In order to promote ‘whistleblowers’ to use this
independent review system, confidentiality will be offered to
the employees who file a complaint. The proceedings will not
be open to the public and the employees who filed for the
review will not have their names revealed to the agency who
he or she works for.166 Furthermore, as in other whistleblower
laws, employees would be immune from civil or criminal
liability167 and professional retaliation,168 if they follow the
order of the panel. Any such retaliation should be a cause of
Similar to FOIA. See supra Part III.C.1.
This will be similar to FOIA exemptions for privacy information
and agency procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). (“This section does not
apply to matters that are personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”). See also S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965)
(“At the same time that a broad philosophy of ‘freedom of
information’ is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain
equally important rights of privacy . . . such as medical and
personnel files.”).
164 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547,
551 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971).
165 “[T]he public interest in compelling disclosure of the information .
. . outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating news
or information.” See the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, S. 448,
111th Cong. (currently stalled in committee).
166 Cf. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998, supra note
140.
167 Congress will have to amend the Espionage Act to allow for
employees to bring such documents to the independent review
board. See Meier, supra note 155, at 223.
168 Congress would have to pass a law such as the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act to establish such protection. See supra
Part III.C.1.
162
163
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action for a civil suit against the agency that employs the
complainant.
Ultimately, the review board will serve as an
ombudsman independent of the executive agencies. The
composition of the independent tribunal is flexible. It could be
a new independent tribunal made up of administrative law
judges from different agencies169 or Congress could instead
create a new court that deals specifically with matters of
government-employees relations.170 Another suggestion is that
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court conduct the
reviews.171 This court consists of eleven federal district court
judges from seven of the United States judicial circuits.172 The
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court appoints each judge
for one seven year term, with a new judge appointed each
year.173 This court is a natural fit because of its familiarity with
matters of national security.174

The ALJ’s could be from the agencies most likely to be the source
of leaks such as the Department of Defense, Department of State, and
Department of Homeland Security.
170 Congress has the authority to create new inferior courts. U.S.
CONST. art. III.
171 See Meier, supra note 155 at 223.
172 Id.
173 Id. Mr. Meier contends:
The only real change that would need to be made to
the current FISA court would be to add a
requirement that when reviewing the status of
national security documents, more than one judge
would be required to make a decision, and a
majority vote would be necessary to either affirm or
reject the designation.
Meier, supra note 155, at 222.
174 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95511, § 103(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1871) (2012). Of course government transparency advocates would
argue against the use of FISC as it rarely blocks the NSA’s actions.
See Erika Eichelberger, FISA Court Has Rejected .03 Percent of all
Government Surveillance Requests, MOTHER JONES, June 10, 2013,
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/06/fisa-court-nsaspying-opinion-reject-request.
169
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2. DETERRING WHISTLEBLOWERS FROM TURNING TO
EXTERNAL OUTLETS
If the independent tribunal finds that the information
does not warrant secret classification, then the executive
agency must reclassify the documents.175 Furthermore, the
whistleblower is then free to ‘blow the whistle’ and release the
documents to any information platform,176 immune from civil
or criminal proceedings and professional retaliation. But,
when the complainants are unsuccessful in their challenge to
the documents’ classification, they will have two disparate
choices.
First, the federal employee (or contractor) can accept
the tribunal’s order and return to work with the knowledge
that he or she is statutorily protected, even if his or her
anonymity is destroyed and he or she is retaliated against.
The second choice is to become a traditional “leaker” of
classified information. But, in these cases, the “whistleblower”
is now legally a “leaker” and he or she will not have any
protection. The employee will be at the mercy of current laws
against “leakers,” including the Espionage Act.177
Nevertheless, the original independent tribunal review will
remain closed. To allow the government access to the original
review would only deter people from using it.178 More
Then the press could access it through FOIA request, though it
will not have to be automatically handed over to the press. But any
FOIA request should be granted, since tribunal review will
incorporate much of the consideration given in FOIA cases.
However, there may be unforeseen roadblocks that Congress will
have to fix by amending FOIA.
176 This includes both traditional news media and new media
platforms such as WikiLeaks.
177 Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794.
178 As Mr. Meier argues:
On the other hand, if a person unsuccessfully
challenges the designation and the document later
ends up being leaked, the government should, at the
very least, be able to use that person's identity in
investigating the source of the leak. Of course, it
cannot simply assume that the person was the
leaker; to the contrary, it seems that the person who
went to the trouble to get the document reviewed by
175
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importantly, in cases where the information was leaked by
someone other than the original complainant, it would
unnecessarily punish good faith complainants who
unsuccessfully used the internal check but still chose not to
leak.179

V. CONCLUSION
During the Obama Administration, eight people
(government employees or contractors) have been prosecuted
for violating the Espionage Act. Prior to 2009, only three
people had ever been prosecuted. In many of the recent cases,
information was reported to the public through the press. It
was information that served the public interest and exposed
government activity that ranged from mismanagement to
outright criminal. In many of these cases, the whistleblower
first attempted to use legal channels and report to superiors
and then to Congress, but to no avail. It was the inaction
inside the government that compelled these whistleblowers to
go to the press. The cost to the whistleblower was often
prosecution, conviction and jail time.180
the court should be presumed not to be the leaker.
However, the government could talk to that person
in an effort to determine the source of the leak. It is
doubtful that this would have any chilling effect
because, as already discussed, the people who
would be inclined to use the independent review
court would generally be acting in good faith and
would therefore be likely to abide by the court's
ruling.
Meier, supra note 155, at 223-224.
179 If there was not confidentiality in the review process, the
complainant would immediately become a suspect and his or her
name would justifiably be associated with the leak without much
recourse against the publicity. Though their job would be statutorily
protected from retaliation for the original review, there are other
concerns. Much of the deterrence for potential whistleblowers is the
social retaliation from coworkers. See, e.g., Mindy Bergman et al., The
(Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences of
Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230 (2002).
180 Edward Snowden had to leave the country and take asylum in
Russia. See supra Part II.B.
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Ultimately the system is not working. Something needs
to change. This article forwards a new policy that allows for
concerned employees in the national security arena to report
mismanagement in good faith, with the assurance that an
independent body will hear them and protect them from
retaliation. At the same time, the policy allows the government
to protect secrets that are truly dangerous to our national
security or information which will not serve the public interest
if published. The new policy does not protect leakers who do
not go through the proper channels. But, under the current
laws, if a good faith whistleblower wants the public to know
about transgressions in the intelligence and defense agencies,
then going outside of the government is the only choice and it
will continue to be.181

Current whistleblower protections “would give pause to even the
most altruistic and well-intentioned whistleblowers.” Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After
Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2008).
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COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC
WHISTLEBLOWER?:
THE IMPACT OF EDWARD SNOWDEN’S
DISCLOSURES ON CANADA AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM’S SECURITY ESTABLISHMENTS
Daniel Alati1
The ‘world’s most wanted man,’ Edward Snowden,
might be one of the most polarizing figures in modern history.
This is particularly true in the United States, where the debates
pertaining to his leaks of classified information could not be
more divided. Many Americans, including senior level
government officials, have publicly argued that Snowden is a
cowardly traitor, and have forcefully stated their belief that
Snowden should return home to face a myriad of criminal
charges, including those under the 1917 Espionage Act.
However, many others have gone to great lengths and taken
immense personal risks to support Snowden and help further
his goal of bringing to light some of the most egregious
surveillance abuses ever released into the public sphere.
Dr. Daniel Alati is a post-doctoral researcher at the City University
of Hong Kong. His doctoral studies at the University of Oxford
focused on comparative anti-terrorism mechanisms in Canada and
the United Kingdom.
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Snowden’s closest confidants are still eager to tell his story:
Laura Poitras’ documentary ‘Citizenfour’ has received rave
reviews2 and long-time NSA critic and journalist James
Bamford recently interviewed Snowden in Moscow for
WIRED magazine.3
They continue to release leaked
documents that expose the greatest abuses of the global
surveillance machine Glenn Greenwald’s website, The
Intercept, reported recently that Canada’s leading surveillance
agency is analyzing records of up to fifteen million downloads
daily to track extremists.4 As a result, it seems likely that the
Snowden leaks, already considered by many to be the most
infamous example of whistleblowing of all time, will be a topic
of American and global conversation for years to come.
However, what is less clear is what kind of tangible
legislative change (if any) the Snowden leaks will bring about,
particularly in countries other than the U.S. While much has
been written about how the Snowden leaks have, and will
continue to, influence American domestic policy and
American diplomatic and intelligence-sharing arrangements
with other nations, less has been written about the impact that
the leaks have had on some of the U.S.’ most important allies.
This paper analyzes what impact the Snowden leaks have had
in Canada and the United Kingdom. Sections one and two
analyze the impact the Snowden disclosures have had on civil
society. In doing so, it notes a glaring lack of parliamentary
mechanisms for oversight of intelligence activities in Canada
and also illuminates issues with the existing mechanisms in
the UK. Section three examines what, if any, tangible
legislative outcomes have resulted from the Snowden leaks. It
concludes that it is difficult to assign any tangible legislative
Peter Bradshaw, Citizenfour Review – Gripping Snowden Documentary
Offers Portrait of Power, Paranoia, and One Remarkable Man, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/oct/16/citizen-fourreview-edward-snowden-documentary.
3 James Bamford, Edward Snowden: The Untold Story, WIRED MAG.,
Aug. 22, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edwardsnowden/.
4 Ryan Gallagher & Glenn Greenwald, Canada Casts Global
Surveillance Dragnet Over File Downloads, THE INTERCEPT, Jan. 28,
2015, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cselevitation-mass-surveillance/.
2
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outcomes in either country to the leaks. Finally, in the
concluding section, recommendations for changes to the
oversight mechanisms in both countries that may help to
prevent the reoccurrence of some of the most egregious abuses
exposed by the Snowden leaks are posited.

I. CANADA – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON CIVIL
SOCIETY
Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the Snowden
disclosures there was a significant amount of material
published by Canadian academics, legal associations, judges,
standing committee members, Parliamentarians and the
media. This was to be expected as “Snowden’s revelations
have implicated Canada’s foreign intelligence signals agency –
the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) – in
expansive domestic and foreign surveillance initiatives.”5
Some of these expansive and troubling initiatives, which
implicated both CSEC and other Canadian officials, include:
CSEC using airport Wi-Fi to track Canadian travelers;6 CSEC
setting up hidden spying posts in about twenty countries in
which it conducted espionage at the behest of the NSA;7
Canada allowing the NSA to spy on Canadian soil during the
2010 G8 and G20 Summits;8 Canadian embassies overseas

Simon Davies, A Crisis of Accountability: A Global Analysis of the
Impact of the Snowden Revelations, THE PRIVACY SURGEON 22 (2014),
https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Snowdenfinal-report-for-publication.pdf.
6 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, CSEC Used
Airport Wi-Fi to Track Canadian Travellers: Edward Snowden documents,
CBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csecused-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowdendocuments-1.2517881.
7 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, Snowden
Document Shows Canada Set Up Posts for NSA, CBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2013,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/snowden-document-showscanada-set-up-spy-posts-for-nsa-1.2456886.
8 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, New Snowden
Docs Show U.S. Spied During G20 in Toronto, CBC NEWS, Nov. 27,
2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-showu-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448.
5
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using eavesdropping technology;9 and, finally, allegations that
Canadian spies collected metadata of phone calls and e-mails
to and from Brazil’s Mines and Energy Ministry.10 While these
are only some examples of deeply worrisome Canadian
complicity in NSA activity, they underscore one of the most
significant areas of concern to be expressed by Canadian civil
society: the deep inter-connection between Canada and the
United States and the corresponding connection between their
intelligence activities. That Canada and the U.S. share deep
economic, geographic, and cultural ties is no secret, but the
extreme inter-connectedness of these two countries (and its
impact on their intelligence-sharing relationships) begs further
elucidation.
Farson and Teeple note that, “[t]he significance of the
long-standing economic relationship with the U.S. may be
even greater today for both parties, particularly given that
other traditional political and military allies are now economic
competitors. Certainly, it has become ever more integrated
with both countries remaining each other’s most significant
trading partner.”11 Moreover, Farson and Teeple point to
many other shared linkages between the countries that are
crucial to their intelligence sharing relationships, namely,
critical telecommunications and security infrastructure, and
argue that Canada has been seen as a “freeloader” because of
the imbalance between the two countries’ differing
contributions to North American defence and security.12
Canada, like the UK, is a member of the “Five Eyes”
community that

Colin Freeze, Canadian Embassies Eavesdrop, Leak Says, THE GLOBE &
MAIL, Oct. 29, 2013,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canada-involvedin-us-spying-efforts-abroad-leaked-documentsays/article15133508/.
10 Canadian Spies Targeted Brazil’s Mines Ministry: Report, CBC NEWS
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadian-spies-targetedbrazil-s-mines-ministry-report-1.1927975.
11 Stuart Farson & Nancy Teeple, Increasing Canada’s Foreign
Intelligence Capability: Is it a Dead Issue?, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L
SECURITY, Vol. 30, 47, 59 (2015).
12 Id. at 60.
9
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pools their resources, divide targets according
to geographic location and expertise, and share
analyses. In all cases, the NSA is the big
brother. In some instances, it helps fund the
activities of its partners in order to influence
intelligence gathering programs. . . . Canada’s
contribution focuses on the northern regions of
Russia and China, Latin America, as well the
northern parts of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.13

Academic commentators have criticized various
aspects of the intelligence sharing relationships between the
two counties. Clement has noted that,
[w]ell before the Snowden revelations, CIRA
commissioned an expert study of the Canadian
Internet infrastructure, which compared all
Canadian routings with those that transited the
United
States
and
found
significant
inefficiencies with the boomerang routing.
CIRA’s report concluded that Canadian
Internet access is heavily and unnecessarily
dependent
upon
foreign
infrastructure,
especially US infrastructure.14
He laments the fact that much of Canada’s internal Internet
traffic is routed through the US, noting that the lack of
international submarine fiber optic cables in Canada means
that “almost all of Canada’s third country Internet traffic is
similarly routed through the United States and via NSA
surveillance operations.”15 While some Canadian Internet
companies, such as Bell Canada, have seized upon this
opportunity to offer “safer, more private, domestic” Internet

Id. at 63.
Andrew Clement, Canada’s Bad Dream, WORLD POL’Y J., Vol. 31, 2533, 30 (2014), available at
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2014/canada's-baddream.
15 Id. at 27.
13
14
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solutions,16 the post-Snowden climate in Canada still
represents what Wesley Wark calls a “hopeful and distressing
reality.”17 According to Wark, it is
[h]opeful in the sense that we can anticipate a
kind of recalibration of US-led global
surveillance which might accord with our own
principles and interests; distressing in that it
reveals that Canada, enmeshed in its
dependency on the NSA, and suffering
problems of endemic secrecy, inadequate laws,
poor
accountability,
hands-off
political
leadership, and an ill-informed public, cannot
make independent headway in coming up with
our own, applied Snowden verdict on global
surveillance.18
Other than the issues noted above, there are several
obstacles to the effective development and operation of a
specifically Canadian system of intelligence oversight and
accountability. The first is cultural. As Jeffrey Roy notes,
[t]here is often a tendency in Canada to view
such activity with a certain detachment and
smugness: thank goodness that’s not us. Yet,
almost every significant scandal involving
government action in the US has been
accompanied by revelations in Canada that
public sector authorities are acting in a
remarkably similar manner.19
The second, more significant obstacle, is the lack of any
established parliamentary review mechanisms that provide for
Id. at 27-28.
Loch K. Johnson et. al, An INS Special Forum: Implications of the
Snowden Leaks, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY, Vol. 29, 793-810
(2014).
18 Id.
19 Jeffrey Roy, Secrecy, Security and Digital Literacy in an Era of MetaData: Why the Canadian Westminster Model Falls Short, INTELLIGENCE &
NAT’L SECURITY, 2-3 (2015).
16
17
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any kind of meaningful oversight or accountability. As will be
discussed further below, attempts to set up a National Security
Committee of Parliamentarians have been stymied for over a
decade, despite support for such a Committee stemming from
judicial inquiries, reports of parliamentary committees, civil
society organizations and the wider legal community. The
result is the “absence of such oversight altogether, which is
how one can reasonable characterize the Canadian model.
With the partial exception of Ministers directing them,
Canadian Parliamentarians are shielded from scrutinizing
security authorities in any direct and meaningful manner.”20
In order to more fully understand Canada’s current
lack of meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary review and
accountability of intelligence service activities, several stymied
attempts on behalf of Canadian civil society actors over the
course of the last decade must be noted. The first unsuccessful
attempt to create a novel Parliamentary Committee on
National Security (composed of both MPs and Senators from
across party lines) occurred in 2005 under a Liberal minority
government with the tabling of Bill C-81.21 Despite cross-party
support, that bill died on the order paper following the 2005
dissolution of the Canadian Parliament. The continuing lack
of effective parliamentary oversight was subsequently
criticized by two separate, independent judicial reviews
carried out by Justices O’Connor and Iacobucci pertaining to
the actions of Canadian officials in the war on terror (in
particular, CSIS and the RCMP).22 In particular, O’Connor
noted that the rendition experienced by Maher Arar urgently
emphasized that Canada was in need of an independent
national security review framework. A Standing Committee
on Public Safety and National Security tasked with reviewing
Iacobucci and O’Connor’s findings and recommendations
would later in 2009 find it “regrettable that the government
Id. at 7.
Full text, legislative history, and additional information pertaining
to the bill available at http://openparliament.ca/bills/38-1/C-81/.
22 Government of Canada Publications, Internal Inquiry into the
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad
Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin,
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/bcppco/CP32-90-1-2010-eng.pdf.
20
21
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has not yet established the independent national security
review framework recommended by Justice O’Connor” and
argue that said framework was “essential to prevent further
human rights violations.”23 They forcefully added that “there
was an urgent need for action” and that without an integrated
structure for the full review of national security issues,
Canadians would be at further risk of violations of their rights
and freedoms.24
To this date, no mechanism for parliamentary
oversight of intelligence or security mechanisms in Canada,
along the lines of that proposed in Bill C-81 or envisioned by
Justice O’Connor, exists.25 The ignorance of this alarming lack
of oversight seems to be a trend continuing through successive
Canadian governments that now continues under the current
Conservative government’s administration. For example, as
noted by Roy,
[a] report published by the federal Privacy
Commissioner in early 2014, in line with much
of the earlier analysis of the Canadian
apparatus, calls for fundamental political
reforms too ineffective or simply absent
mechanisms for overseeing the data gathering
activities of Canadian federal authorities as well
as the public and private sectors more widely.
Ottawa Standing Committee on Public Safety and National
Security, Review of the Findings and Recommendations Arising from the
Iacobucci and O’Connor Inquiries,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId
=4004074.
24 Id. at 11-17. Recommendation five of this report states that, “[t]he
Committee recommends, once again, that Bill C-81, introduced in the
38th Parliament, An Act to Establish the National Security
Committee of Parliamentarians, or a variation of it, be introduced in
Parliament at the earliest opportunity.”
25 Two Bills (S-220, infra note 32, and C-551, infra note 33) have been
introduced in both the House and the Senate that continue the work
of Bill C-81, although neither bill has made any kind of significant
progress. For example, Bill C-551 was introduced into the House in
November of 2013 and has yet to progress, while Bill S-220 was
introduced into the Senate in May 2014 and has still yet to pass
Second Reading. Id.
23
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The report was widely applauded by Canadian
security experts, though largely ignored by the
Government itself.26

It is within this context of ignorance that the concerns of
Canadian civil society echo even louder. The Protect Our
Privacy Coalition, which is made up of more than fifty civil
society organisations, has launched an online initiative calling
on Members of Parliament to introduce restrictions that would
curtail CSEC’s most egregious abuses.27 Moreover, the British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association is constitutionally
challenging aspects of CSEC’s legal and operational
framework,28 and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association has
also launched a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
PIPEDA, Canada’s federal data protection statute.29
Moreover, the Privacy Commissioner has released a statement
regarding telecommunications companies’ responses to
information requests from government authorities, in which a
number of recommendations are made, particularly in regards
to the transparency of authorized disclosures.30
In addition to these civil society actors, a number of
interested Members of Canadian Parliament have tried to
push for additional debate pertaining to CSEC’s activities and
Canada’s glaring lack of parliamentary overview of
Roy, supra note 19 at 17-18.
See OPEN MEDIA, https://openmedia.ca/ourprivacy (last visited
Oct. 23, 2015).
28 The litigation is ongoing. See Globe Editorial, Hey CSEC, Stop
Spying on Me, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2014,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/dontspy-on-me-csec/article17781948.
29 The litigation is ongoing. See Alex Boutilier, Canadian Civil Liberties
Group Launches Court Challenge on Warrantless Access, THE TORONTO
STAR, May 21, 2014,
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/05/21/canadian_civi
l_liberties_group_launches_court_challenge_on_warrantless_access.
html.
30 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Statement from
the Interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada Regarding
Telecommunications Companies’ Responses to Information Requests from
Government Authorities, https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nrc/2014/s-d_140430_e.asp.
26
27
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intelligence activities. In calling for an emergency debate on
CSEC’s meta-data collection program, MP Charmaine Borg
argued that,
[a]n emergency debate is needed so that
parliamentarians can take an in-depth look at
the extent to which Canadians' personal
information, metadata and other information
are collected by the police, law enforcement
agencies and national security agencies. This
debate is also needed so that we can look at
measures that will lead to appropriate
parliamentary oversight and ways to balance
public and national security interests with
Canadians' privacy rights.31
Moreover, as aforementioned, interested members of
Parliament have introduced two bills (S-22032 and C-55133) in
order to further the work of C-81 and create a Parliamentary
Committee for the oversight of national security and
intelligence activities. The current Canadian government’s
response (or lack thereof) to the various efforts of academics
and other civil society actors outlined in this section will be
considered in this paper’s subsequent analysis of tangible
legislative outcomes to result from the Snowden disclosures.

II. UNITED KINGDOM – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES
ON CIVIL SOCIETY

Charmaine Borg on Request for Emergency Debate, June 13, 2013,
http://openparliament.ca/debates/2013/6/13/charmaine-borg1/only/.
32 An Act to Establish the Intelligence and Security Committee of
Parliament,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6556209&L
anguage=E&Mode=1
33 National Security Committee of Parliamentarians Act,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6256801&L
anguage=E&Mode=1.
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Whereas the Snowden disclosures in Canada and the
United States sparked widespread civil society debate and
condemnation, reaction to the disclosures in the United
Kingdom has been markedly different, particularly in regards
to the responses from the political classes. As Martin Moore
notes,
[t]he reaction in the UK has to date been
startlingly different. The political class jointly
defended the actions of the security services,
and most shied away from proposing reform of
the law. The press was split on their response,
some recommending prosecution of the
messenger, The Guardian. . . . It is difficult to
explain why the reaction in the two countries
has been so different. No doubt partly it is
cultural, and partly due to contrasting public
attitudes in the UK and US to the role of the
state. It must also be due in part to the UK’s
intelligence services’ importance to its
international status. Intelligence remains one
area where the UK is considered, in terms of
expertise and performance, to be on a par with
global superpowers.34
As was the case with CSEC in Canada, the material disclosed
by Snowden implicated the UK’s counterpart GCHQ
(Government Communications Head Quarters) in various
spying activities. Mark Young notes that, “British government
concerns about the potential publication of classified data
were significant enough to threaten The Guardian with legal
action if the information was not destroyed. The threats
prompted the destruction of hard drives containing
information related to GCHQ.”35

Martin Moore, RIP RIPA? Snowden, Surveillance, and the
Inadequacies of our Existing Legal Framework, THE POL. Q., Vol. 85, No.
2, 125-132, 125-126 (2014).
35 Mark Young, National Insecurity: The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of
Classified Information, I/S: A J. OF LAW & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y,
Vol. 10, 367, 368 (2014).
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The United Kingdom has been placed in a particularly
precarious position by the Snowden disclosures because of its
relationship with the European Union. As was the case with
Canada and the United States, the United Kingdom and the
European Union share a vast inter-connectedness in several
fields, including intelligence sharing and gathering. For
instance, Bauman notes that, “[t]he UK has been in an
especially delicate position given that GCHQ has participated
in aggressive behavior against other partners and EU
institutions while being part of the European Union and
having signed the EU treaty which requires member states’
loyalty.”36 Again, similar to what was the case in Canada and
the United States, much of Europe’s Internet traffic is routed
through the United Kingdom. As Brown and Korff note, the
UK
is the landing point for the majority of
transatlantic fibre-optic cables. GCHQ has
reportedly placed data interceptors on fibreoptic cables conveying internet data in and out
of the UK, and are able to store a significant
fraction of global Internet traffic for three days
on a rolling basis while carrying out further
automated analysis.37
Despite Canada’s connections to the United States, and the
UK’s connection to Europe, it is clear that the NSA and the
GCHQ have invested more resources in their activities than
any other organisations on earth. As Bauman notes,
[t]he NSA has a budget of US $10.8 bn (7.8 bn
Euros) a year, whereas within Europe GCHQ’s
budget of 1.2 bn Euros is well below the NSA,
but nevertheless over twice the yearly budget of
other agencies such as BND, FRA, or DGSE.
This is why it may be more accurate to speak of
Zygmunet Bauman et. al, After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of
Surveillance, INT’L POL. SOC., Vol. 8, 121-144, 127 (2014).
37 Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in
a Global Digital Environment, EUROPEAN HUM. RTS L. REV., Vol. 3, 243251, 243 (2014).
36
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an Anglo-American guild of professionals
extended to other Western intelligence services
than to analyze the network as a US-European
collaboration on an equal footing, or even a
transatlantic collaboration correlated with
NATO.38

Unlike Canada, the United Kingdom does have various
mechanisms for oversight of national security and intelligence
activities, which has led to a variety of pre and post-Snowden
analyses and recommendations for change. As Sudha Setty
notes,
[n]umerous parliamentary committees have
undertaken investigations of the surveillance
apparatus in the United Kingdom. A broad
investigation by the Constitution Committee
led to findings in 2009 that the intelligencegathering services were largely compliant with
the law, but that report included numerous
recommendations for changes to surveillance
authority and transparency, including giving
greater consideration to civil liberties before
implementing further surveillance programs,
granting
greater
authority
to
various
commissioners to exercise increased oversight,
revisiting existing legislation to increase
specificity in the surveillance authority, and
making the work of the Investigatory Powers
Tribunal more transparent.39
Writing in Martin Moore’s piece, Jenna Stratford, QC agrees
that there are flaws with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal,
namely that “[w]here complaints are rejected, as the huge
majority unsurprisingly are, claimants are not given proper
reasons but instead the judicial equivalent of a ‘neither
confirm nor deny’ notice. In addition, at present there is no
possibility of appeal from the Tribunal’s decisions, so that
Bauman, supra note 36.
Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful
Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT'L L. 69 (2015).
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probably the only recourse is to Strasbourg.”40 Furthermore,
the Intelligence and Security Committee considered whether
GCHQ’s receipt of information by the NSA from the PRISM
program was legal, ultimately finding that the GCHQ’s
actions were compliant with the statutory framework, but
concluding that the framework required additional
specificity.41
A further complication arises in the United Kingdom
because of the operation of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act (RIPA).42 As Setty notes, under the operation of
this act,
[t]he sole recourse for challenging such actions
under U.K. law is making a claim to the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal and that,
although the Human Rights Act 1998
incorporates the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”) into U.K. domestic
law, if the judiciary believes that a national
security measure is incompatible with the
ECHR standard, it may declare incompatibility
but this does not constitute a mandate that the
domestic security apparatus change its policies.
As such, review at the domestic level has often
been sharply curtailed.43
RIPA has been criticized by many as an outdated piece of
legislation that does not fit the current realities of our
technologically advanced world. Lord Ken Macdonald QC,
who was the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and
Wales from 2003-2008, argues that RIPA “was not written in
the age of social media and big data. It is inherently
Moore, supra note 34.
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Statement on
GCHQ’s Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM
Programme, July 17, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/225459/ISC-Statement-on-GCHQ.pdf.
42 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents.
43 Setty, supra note 39.
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backwardlooking” and Jenna Straford echoes this sentiment
by stating that, “RIPA contains only limited restrictions on the
transfer of data to third-party powers. The Secretary of State
has extremely wide discretion—almost unfettered in
practice—to determine whether data may be transferred.”44
Despite the aforementioned varying responses by the
media and political classes following the Snowden revelations,
members of UK civil society have taken issue with the political
responses of the UK Government in the post-Snowden era. In
the Institute for Public Policy Research’s Study Democracy in
Britain, Lord Macdonald argues that revelations about the
GCHQ’s Project Tempora
point, perhaps, to an excessive and therefore
damaging devotion to secrecy that appears to
trump the right, even of parliament, to have a
basic say in our security arrangements. The
apparent manner of its conception and the
government’s response to its being revealed is
each troubling for the light it casts on questions
of oversight and democratic accountability.45
For Lord Macdonald, one of the most troubling aspects of
what the Snowden disclosures revealed was that the GCHQ
developed these capabilities while Government arguments to
enact them in legislation were being successfully defeated in
Parliament. As he notes, “[w]e are witnessing the creation of a
very broad surveillance scheme by the backdoor – as
successive governments have failed to persuade parliament
that such schemes are justified or desirable – and a
simultaneous growth in capacity and ambition on the part of
GCHQ in the complete absence of debate, still less
legislation.”46 Lord Macdonald refers to recent government
attempts to suggest that Tempora is implicitly authorized by
RIPA as “deeply unconvincing,” questioning how it was
possible that, “[i]f Chris Huhne is to be believed, the cabinet
Moore, supra note 34.
Guy Lodge & Glenn Gottfried (eds.), Democracy in Britain: Essays in
Honour of James Cornford, INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (LONDON: UNITED
KINGDOM) 173 (2014).
46 Id. at 174.
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and national security council did know [about Tempora].
They were never told.”47
Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee released a seething report pertaining to the current
UK mechanisms for intelligence oversight,48 in which it
criticized members of the British civil service – particularly the
National Security Adviser and the head of MI5 – for refusing
to give evidence.49 While the Committee did acknowledge
that the Justice and Security Act50 made some changes to the
Intelligence and Security Committee, it still concluded that,
[w]e do not believe the current system of
oversight is effective and we have concerns that
the weak nature of that system has an impact
upon the credibility of the agencies
accountability, and to the credibility of
Parliament itself. Whilst we recognize the
importance of limiting the access to documents
of a confidential nature . . . engagement with
elected representatives is not, in itself, a danger
to national security and to continue to insist so
is hyperbole.51
It also levied several criticisms towards the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal and RIPA,52 and called it “unacceptable” that
there was so much confusion around the work of the
Intelligence Services Commissioner.53 In doing so, they made
a number of recommendations that will be considered further
in this paper’s subsequent (and concluding) section on
recommendations for change.
Id. at 175.
HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, COUNTERTERRORISM: SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2013-14, 66 [hereinafter
Home Affairs Committee 17th Report], available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/c
mhaff/231/231.pdf.
49 Id.
50 Justice and Security Act 2013 c. 18, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents/enacted.
51 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48.
52 Id. at 63-4, 70-71.
53 Id. at 66.
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III. CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM – THE IMPACT OF
THE SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON TANGIBLE LEGISLATIVE
OUTCOMES
Andrew Clement has argued that, “[h]ow Canada
responds to the NSA-Snowden crisis will define its identity
and shape its future for decades to come.”54 Unfortunately, if
the early returns are a sign of things to come, Canada is not on
its way to responding to the Snowden disclosures in any kind
of comprehensive or definitive manner. Granted, in the first
section of this paper, several attempts were made by members
of Canadian civil society to point to a glaring lack of
parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities. As noted in
A Crisis of Accountability, a joint publication published in
association with the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for
Information Law and the Vrije Universiteit of Brussels,
“[w]hile the net result has led to a greater understanding of
CSEC’s activities and objectives, there has been minimal
concrete movement towards reform aside from some early
judicial proceedings.”55 It is still unknown at this point
whether either of the aforementioned constitutional challenges
launched by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
or the Canadian Civil Liberties Association will lead to fruitful
reform. Despite a very active civil society, responses from the
current Conservative government have been sparse.
Hopes for future tangible legislative outcomes are
further called into question by the past track record of
successive Canadian governments. For over a decade now,
various iterations of Bill C-81 (which would enact a National
Security Committee of Parliamentarians to provide some form
of parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence activities) have died
in successive Canadian parliaments, despite cross-party
support in 2005 at the time of the bill’s inception. At that time,
political instability associated with successive minority
governments (and the corresponding dissolution of
Parliament) could easily be assigned blame for the demise of
Bill C-81. However, as Roy Notes, “[i]f partisan collaboration
is rare and tenuous during minority regimes, it is quickly
54
55

Clement, supra note 27.
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forgotten once majority status is returned since the victors see
little compelling reasoning in sharing unfettered power with
its now-defeated opponents.”56 The aforementioned current
iterations of the bills (Bills S-220 and C-551) have been moving
through Parliament at a snail’s pace, despite the impetus placed
on them by the Snowden revelations. Even before the
Snowden revelations, two separate judicial inquiries by
Justices Iacobucci and O’Connor (both of which attracted
significant public attention) called attention to an alarming
lack of parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities in
Canada. To date, the recommendations of these inquiries have
still not been taken up by the Canadian government, despite
the fact that the Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security has reiterated their importance. While
Canadians often enjoy debating the potential shortcomings of
the US Congressional model, “other likeminded democracies
have or are also forging more robust oversight and review
mechanisms that are likely to prove increasingly consequential
in balancing competing interests of security, secrecy and
privacy in an environment of digital connectedness and
information abundance.”57 Canada can ill-afford to stay
stagnant in a world that continues to evolve and produce new
digital realities. Nor can it afford to hope that its civil society
or its courts will spur the Canadian government to action.
To contrast, the issue in the UK is certainly not a lack of
parliamentary oversight mechanisms of intelligence activities,
but rather the appropriate means through which existing
legislation and mechanisms should be refined. For the most
part, the UK Government has responded with silence and
secrecy, even going so far as to attack The Guardian and force
them to destroy material that would be damaging to the
GCHQ. It has been noted that, “Deputy Prime Minister Nick
Clegg has ordered an ’Obama-style’ review of intelligence
agencies, to be led by the Royal United Services Institute, but
the report will not even be released until after the May 2015
elections.”58 As a result of this government response, Brown
and Korff have argued that, “[i]t seems judicial intervention
will be required to bring the UK’s legal framework back into
Roy, supra note 19 at 8.
Id. at 22.
58 Davies, supra note 5, 70.
56
57
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compliance with the Human Rights Convention.”59 As noted
above by Setty, even successful litigation may not bring about
effective change because of the UK’s complex arrangements
under RIPA, the European Convention for Human Rights and
the Human Rights Act. As a result, “[w]ithout a Snowden-like
disclosure to enable such review, or a strong commitment by
the United Kingdom to abide by the human rights standards
articulated at the European level, parliamentary oversight
would be the key mechanism to protect against overreaching
by the British intelligence community.”60
If parliamentary oversight is to be the key mechanism
to protect against future overreaching of the British
intelligence community, then the recommendations put
forward by UK civil society members, in particular Lord
Macdonald and the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee, need to be taken seriously. While some may
argue that the 2013 Justice and Security Act attempted to do
just that,61 others are more skeptical. As Lord Macdonald
notes,
[t]he Justice and Security Act passed last year
handed marginally more power to the ISC, but
did little to correct executive control over it.
For example, each committee member is now
appointed by parliament but must first be
nominated for membership by the prime
minister. The ISC now has the power to call for
evidence or information from ministers and
agencies; however, the means and manner in
which information can be provided to the ISC
must be outlined through a memorandum of
understanding with the prime minister. In the
Brown & Korff, supra note 37 at 6.
Setty, supra note 39 at 28.
61 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48 at 62. “A
number of witnesses to this inquiry took the opportunity to highlight
the improvements to the Intelligence and Security Committee which
were contained within the Justice and Security Act 2013. There were
suggestions that the committee ought not to be judged on its
previous failures but rather time ought to be given to see how it
worked under the new regime.” Id.
59
60
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light of the Snowden revelations, it seems that
reforms in the J&S Act did not go far enough.
Moreover, we also need to consider the extent
to which RIPA can be said to remain an
adequate
mechanism
for
regulating
surveillance activities.62
Even if one accepts the argument that the Justice and Security
Act was an attempt to respond to deficiencies in the oversight
of intelligence activities, this paper has noted the concerns of
several academics and civil society actors pertaining to various
other pieces of legislation and mechanisms, including RIPA
and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, that have not been
consequentially amended by that Act. These still require
further attention on the part of the UK Government before any
true tangible legislative outcome can be assessed to the
Snowden disclosures.

IV. CONCLUSION – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
CHANGE
Despite the apparent conclusion that neither the
Canadian nor the UK government has responded to the
Edward Snowden disclosures with tangible, consequential
legislative changes, it cannot be said that these disclosures
have had no impact. The revelations provided for by the
Snowden documents have fundamentally changed public
perceptions in both countries about how intelligence activities
are carried out and have sparked civil society commentary
amongst academics, judges, legal practitioners, interest groups
and the media pertaining to how oversight of intelligence
communities should be improved in the future. The immense
energy and analysis that has gone into these various
commentaries should not be lost. As Wesley Wark argues,
[w]hatever badge we stick to Mr. Snowden
(and his media collaborators) may in itself not
matter very much, and certainly will be
dwarfed by the issue that he has called our
62
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attention to. That issue is the practice, and
future, of global electronic surveillance by state
intelligence agencies. The ultimate verdict(s)
regarding Edward Snowden the man will pale
in significance alongside the verdict(s) on
global surveillance.63

With that in mind, this paper will now conclude by reiterating
some of the most important changes that urgently need to be
considered by both Canada and the UK going forward into a
post-Snowden future.
For Canada, the most urgently needed change required
is clear: the work of Bill C-81 needs to be fast-tracked through
its current iterations, either Bill S-220 or C-551, so that the
country may finally have some form of parliamentary review
and oversight of intelligence activities.
The Canadian
government should not need to be implored to do this through
damaging revelations of sensitive material, which will
undoubtedly continue in the future (as noted at the outset of
this paper, a new Intercept story pertaining to CSEC’s spying
was released only recently). Various successive Canadian
governments have for too long ignored a glaring deficiency in
Canada’s overall national security apparatus. Two separate
judicial inquiries have been commissioned (at no small
expense to the Canadian taxpayer) and both have
recommended the immediate need for additional review
mechanisms. These recommendations have been further
bolstered by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, and have been demanded by various civil
society actors noted in this paper. The Canadian government
is poised to introduce a whole new set of anti-terrorism laws
that it has been working on since last year’s attack on
Parliament Hill.64 There is growing concern that this new
package of laws will actually increase powers of various
Loch K. Johnson et. al, An INS Special Forum: Implications of the
Snowden Leaks, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, Vol. 29, 793810, 810 (2014).
64 Jim Bronskill, Five Things to Know About Canada’s New Antiterrorism Measures, CTV NEWS, Jan. 30, 2015,
http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/five-things-to-know-aboutcanada-s-new-anti-terrorism-measures-1.2213071.
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intelligence and police agencies.65 These concerns are further
exacerbated by the fact that Canada has no genuine
accountability mechanisms for the oversight of these agencies,
or for its national security apparatus as a whole. It is simply
irresponsible for the Canadian government to go forward with
new counter-terrorism legislation without addressing this
glaring gap in its current national security framework.
In contrast to Canada, the United Kingdom is
significantly ahead in regards to existing infrastructure for
parliamentary oversight and accountability of intelligence
activities. That being said, there are a number of targeted
recommendations for change that could significantly improve
these oversight mechanisms, were they to be acted upon by
the UK government. In particular, Lord Macdonald suggests
six additional reforms: 1) The ISC should become a full joint
parliamentary select committee; 2) it should be appointed by
and responsible to both Houses of Parliament; 3) it should
have stronger powers to obtain evidence. These should
include the power to obtain information, by summons, from
outside parties, lay experts, ministers and civil servants, as
well as from security chiefs; 4) it should have an independent
secretariat and independent legal advice, and it should have
access to all information. Select committee procedures already
allow the exclusion of material whose publication might be
harmful and the disclosure of such material is a serious
criminal offence; 5) it’s chair should be a member of the
opposition and should not be someone who has previously
held responsibility for any of the security agencies; 6) Finally,
we need to increase the level of institutional expertise to
ensure that human rights are put at the heart of policy and
strategies in this area, at a level that is more than rhetorical.
We need to consider how such a committee could develop a
wider role in educating parliament as a whole and,
consequently, the public.66
Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee makes a number of recommendations that echo
those of Lord Macdonald. They also believed that there were
Andrea Janus, Spy Service to Get Stronger Under Federal Bill, CTV
NEWS, Jan. 30, 2015, http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/spy-serviceto-get-stronger-under-federal-bill-1.2213119.
66 Lodge & Gottfried, supra note 45 at 178-179.
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several ways in which the ISC could be strengthened: 1)
election of the membership of the Committee by the House of
Commons; 2) the Chair of the Committee being a member of
the Opposition and not a former Minister with responsibility
for any of the agencies; 3) ensuring that the Committee has
access to relevant expertise (for instance in terms of the
technological aspect of the work carried out by the security
and intelligence agencies); 4) allowing other Parliamentary
Committees to scrutinize the work of the security and
intelligence agencies.67 The Committee also recommended
that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal be legislatively
compelled to produce an annual report on their work,
containing at the very least the number of cases it has received
and the outcome of cases determined in that year.68 Finally, in
regards to RIPA, the Committee argued that,
[g]iven the criticism which the Regulation of
the Investigatory Powers Act is subject to, we
believe that the legislation is in need of review.
We recommend that a Joint Committee of both
Houses of Parliament should be appointed in
order to hold an inquiry with the ability to take
evidence on the Act with a view to updating it.
This inquiry would aim to bring the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act up to date with
modern technology, reduce the complexity (and
associated difficulty in the use of) the
legislation, strengthen the statistical and
transparency requirements and improve the
oversight functions as are set out in the current
Act.69
Although both Canada and the UK have very different
starting points for how they should oversee their intelligence
activities in the future, the motive behind both is the same.
Civil society confidence in the ability of both governments to
protect the privacy of their citizens reached an all-time low
following the Snowden disclosures. As is noted by Bauman,
Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48 at 62.
Id. at 63-64.
69 Id. at 70-71.
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[o]nly 5% of respondents in Canada trust
government to guard their data, and this only
rises to 7% in the United States. Whether in the
United States, Canada, or the UK, it is clear
from these results that a substantial proportion
of the population are concerned about
government surveillance and that there is a
high degree of cynicism about what
governments do with those data.70
Members of civil society in both countries are doing what they
can to compel their governments to act, but there is only so
much they can do if their governments are unwilling. Both
Canada and the UK need to start treating the Snowden
disclosures as an opportunity to reassess how they collect
intelligence, when they collect intelligence, who they share
intelligence with and, perhaps most importantly, how they
oversee the collection of that intelligence.
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